Western New England Law Review
Volume 31 31 (2009)
Issue 1

Article 4

1-1-2009

UPROOTING THE CELL-PLANT:
COMPARING UNITED STATES AND
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
APPROACHES TO SURREPTITIOUS
INTERROGATIONS IN THE DETENTION
CONTEXT
Amar Khoday

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Amar Khoday, UPROOTING THE CELL-PLANT: COMPARING UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
APPROACHES TO SURREPTITIOUS INTERROGATIONS IN THE DETENTION CONTEXT, 31 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 39 (2009),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

UPROOTING THE CELL PLANT:
COMPARING UNITED STATES AND
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
APPROACHES TO SURREPTITIOUS
INTERROGATIONS IN THE
DETENTION CONTEXT
AMAR KHODAy*

INTRODUCTION

In their effort to solve crimes, law enforcement agencies em
ploy various interrogation techniques to acquire incriminating evi
dence. Both Canada and the United States afford an accused
certain rights under their respective constitutions that are intended
to protect him from the overreaching power of the state during such
interrogations. These protections include the right to silence and
the right to counsel. 1 When an accused invokes these rights and
refuses to provide any statements, some police officers engage in
surreptitious forms of questioning that subvert the accused's choice
not to speak to the authorities. Enter the cell-plant interrogator.
Cell-plant interrogations involve questioning by an undercover
agent who elicits incriminating statements from an accused who is
unaware that he is speaking with a state agent. 2 These surreptitious
interrogations take place within jailhouses, prisons, or other deten
>I<
Doctor of Civil Law Candidate and O'Brien Fellow at the McGill Centre for
Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, Faculty of Law, McGill University; LLM (McGill
University, 2008); JD (New England School of Law, 2004). This Article is revised from
my LLM thesis submitted to McGill University in 2008. I wish to acknowledge the
suggestions I received with respect to this Article from Professor David Siegel, Laura
Otenti, Esq., Alexandra Harrington, Esq., and Romain Rard. I also wish to express my
thanks to Professor Ronald Sklar, who supervised the writing of the LLM thesis upon
which this Article was based. All errors are mine.
1. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; Charter of Rights and Freedoms §§ 7, 10, Part
I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11
(U.K.).
2. Undercover police officers or jailhouse informants are most often used as state
agents in the context of cell-plant interrogations. In some cases, police officers per
suade friends or family of the accused to assist in procuring incriminating statements.
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tion environments. 3 Such deceptive techniques raise issues of fun
damental fairness for two key reasons. First, cell-plant
interrogations deprive an accused of the ability to make an in
formed choice about whether to voluntarily or knowingly provide
incriminating statements to the state and thus circumvent his right
to remain silent or to have counsel present during an interrogation.
Second, detention environments produce numerous anxieties in an
accused, which an undercover agent may unfairly exploit to the
state's advantage. 4 Undoubtedly, almost all custodial environments
contain coercive elements that disadvantage an accused. However,
during a standard non-surreptitious custodial interrogation, an ac
cused is advised of his constitutional rights and is afforded the right
to have legal counsel present as a buffer between himself and the
state. This prophylaxis is absent in cell-plant interrogations.
Confronted with the possibility of admitting incriminating
statements procured through such deceptive means, courts in Ca
nada and the United States have placed certain restrictions on their
admissibility. These restrictions are rooted in the implied right to
silence embedded within s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and the right to counsel granted by the Sixth Amend
ment to the United States Constitution. 5 Fundamentally, the Su
preme Courts of Canada and the United States have each held that,
in the context of cell-plant interrogations, where a state agent has
elicited incriminating statements from an accused, the statements
may be excluded from evidence. 6 The Supreme Court of Canada
has determined that a cell-plant interrogation conducted in a man
ner that infringes upon an accused's right to silence deprives the
accused of the choice to speak to authorities.1 The Supreme Court
of the United States has affirmed that an accused has a right to
counsel during "the most critical period of the proceedings," when
3. Although the term "cell plant" may suggest that cell-plant interrogations only
take place in the accused's detention cell, these interrogations may occur anywhere in
the detention environment. Nonetheless, the traditional jail cell, given its closed
quarters and relative privacy, is the most likely location where these interrogations take
place.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 18-28.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms §§ 7, 10.
6. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S.
264 (1980); R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 Carswell
Alta 212 (Westlaw); R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151 (Can. 1990), available at 1990
CarswellYukon 7 (Westlaw).
7. Heben, 1990 Carswell Yukon 7, 'lI 138.
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consultation, thorough investigation, and preparation are vitally
important. 8
While Australian9 and British courts,1O in addition to the Euro
pean Court of Human Rights,ll have similarly confronted issues re
lated to cell-plant interrogations, courts in Canada and the United
States have produced the largest and most extensive volume of ju
risprudence on these issues to date. 12 Therefore, for the purposes
of achieving greater depth of analysis, this Article will focus on and
compare the case law from these two countries. Despite the ex
tremely similar language used by Canadian and American courts in
their legal tests, particularly the terms "state agent" and "elicita
tion," these terms have been interpreted in radically different
waysP Furthermore, the scope of s. 7 and the Sixth Amendment
protections are remarkably dissimilar in certain respects. Conse
quently, as this Article shall demonstrate, while factual circum
stances in the United States may lead to the exclusion of evidence
through the application of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Clause, the same factual circumstances may not lead to the same
outcome under Canada's s. 7 right-to-silence protection.
Identifying similarities and distinctions in the criminal proce
dures of different jurisdictions can highlight the flaws and benefits
of the methods that have developed in each country.l4 Such studies
permit jurists and scholars to assess the positive and negative as
pects of applying various legal approaches to particular issues. 1s
Thus, courts in Canada and the United States can learn much from
the strengths and weaknesses of the other's approach to cell-plant
interrogations and consequently provide greater protections (or
8. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (noting that "the most critical period
of the proceeding" for the particular defendants was "the time of their arraignment
until the beginning of their trial"). For a discussion of when this critical period begins,
see infra text accompanying notes 71-73.
9. R. v. Swaffield, (1998) 192 C.L.R. 159 (Austl.), available at 1998 WL 1674165.
10. Allan v. The Queen, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 2236, [1]-[143] (Eng.), available at
2004 WL 1808797.
11. Allan v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003), availa
ble at 2002 WL 31476273.
12. Although Australian courts appear to be producing further jurisprudence on
this matter, it is still relatively small in comparison to their North American counter
parts. See, e.g., Muehleman v. Florida, 484 U.S. 882 (1987); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477
U.S. 436 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264 (1980).
13. See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
14. Erik Luna, A Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIS L.J.
277,284 (2003-04).
15.

[d.
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lesser protections as the case may be) to criminal defendants under
their respective federal constitutional provisions.1 6 This Article will
set out how legal tests in both jurisdictions should be reformulated
accordingly.
Part I will briefly canvass some of the concerns related to the
acquisition of incriminating statements in the detention context and
explain why these concerns should be given greater weight in the
legal tests concerning admissibility of cell-plant statements. Part II
will examine and compare the temporal, spatial, and subject matter
scopes of protections in s. 7 and the Sixth Amendment by compar
ing when and where the respective legal protections are operative
and by looking at which crimes the rights apply to during an inter
rogation. Parts III and IV respectively, compare and analyze the
jurisdictions' different interpretations of the state agency and elici
tation tests by examining the relevant jurisprudence and discussing
the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Ultimately, this
Article concludes that the current legal tests in each country should
be reformulated to incorporate the most protective aspects of each
system. Specifically, the legal tests should be reconstructed to in
corporate the definition of state agency rooted in Canadian juris
prudence, while the definition of elicitation should be based on an
interpretation found in United States case law.
1.

DETENTION ENVIRONMENTS

Jailhouses and prisons have their own unique pressures, sub
cultures, and social normsP Professor George Dix has noted that
an accused's "confinement is likely to bring into play subtle influ
ences that will make [him] particularly susceptible to undercover
investigators' ploYS."18 He asserted that "[m]ere confinement
might increase a subject's anxiety, and he is likely to seek discourse
with others to relieve this anxiety. That search [for a discourse], of
course, makes him more susceptible to an undercover investigator
16. Conversely, courts in one jurisdiction may also adopt a more restrictive view
of constitutional rights that is prevalent elsewhere and affords police agencies greater
leeway in engaging in cell-plant interrogations.
17. See RICHARD S. )ONES & THOMAS J. SCHMID, DOING TIME: PRISON EXPERI
ENCE AND IDENTITY AMONG FIRST-TIME INMATES 1-4 (2000) ("Prisoners are thus as
similated into an inmate society which places considerable importance on antisocial
attitudes and behavior; within this society, prisoners show solidarity and gain status by
adhering to the 'inmate code_' "). However, not all detention environments are the
same. For a discussion of jailhouse environments, see infra note 20.
18. George E. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L.
REV_ 203, 230 (1975)_
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seeking information about the offense for which the subject has
been arrested."19 Within the context of jailhouse confinement spe
cifically, the four areas likely to decrease a sense of anxiety are,
"withstanding entry shock, maintaining outside links, securing sta
bility in a situation of seeming chaos, and finding activities to fill
otherwise empty time. "20
If confinement itself increases an accused's anxiety, violence
within detention contexts is very likely to augment this angst signifi
cantly.21 Hans Toch argues that "[c]aricatures of maleness are con
sensually touted, and (sometimes fraudulently) advertised.
Credible or even incredible achievements in physical combat and
sexual conquest are rewarded with status, esteem, and collective ad
miration. "22 He has noted furthermore that "prisons offer a quality
of life redolent with restrictions, frustrations, and affronts to self
esteem. "23 In light of the many affronts to dignity and status in the
detention context, "[s]tatus calls for demonstrations of bravery or
fearlessness, toughness, physical prowess, and loyalty to one's
kind. "24 Justice Thurgood Marshall observed that "where the sus
pect is incarcerated, the constant threat of physical danger peculiar
to the prison environment may make him demonstrate his tough
ness to other inmates by recounting or inventing past violent
acts."25
Also adding to the state's advantage over an accused in the
context of cell-plant interrogations is the fact that law enforcement
19. [d.
20. John M. Klofas, The Jail and the Community, in INCARCERATING CRIMINALS:
PRISONS AND JAILS IN SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 244,246 (Timothy J.
Flanagan et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter INCARCERATING CRIMINALS]. While individuals
. are incarcerated in both prisons and jails, the former are primarily used to house con
victed felons. Jails, conversely, are populated by persons "awaiting trial for serious and
nonserious offenses, persons serving time for misdemeanors, persons awaiting transfer
to state prison systems, mental health facilities, and other settings." See INCARCERAT
ING CRIMINALS, supra, at 220. The context of jailhouse confinement is particularly rele
vant in the case of cell-plant interrogations. Police are often seeking incriminating
information about individuals who are being detained pending trial and thus they will
be housed in jails more than in any other detention contexts. Most of the cases dis
cussed in this article involved cell-plant interrogation that took place in jail.
21. See Hans Toch, Hypermasculinity and Prison Violence, in MASCULINITIES
AND VIOLENCE (Lee H. Bowker ed., 1998); see also JAMES McGRATH MORRIS, JAIL
HOUSE JOURNALISM: THE FOURTH ESTATE BEHIND BARS 9 (Transaction Publishers
2002) (1998).
22. Toch, supra note 21, at 171.
23. [d.
24. [d. at 172.
25. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 307 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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agents can control the suspect's ability to select people with whom
he can confide. 26 Professor Welsh S. White posits that "the police
can insure that if the pressures of confinement lead the suspect to
confide in anyone, it will be a police agent."27 Given the state's
power to control an accused's "channels of communication, it is bla
tantly unfair to allow the government to exploit the suspect's vul
nerability by trickery of this type. "28 Incarcerated individuals thus
have to bear not only the inherent stress that arises from being in
vestigated and interrogated, but also need to manage the anxieties
that arise from incarceration itself. These pressures and anxieties
should be taken into account when considering the admissibility of
statements procured through cell-plant interrogations. With these
considerations in mind, the following sections will begin to trace the
different dimensions of the constitutional rights at play with an
overview of the historical context of these rights.

II.

THE SCOPE OF SECTION SEVEN AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

A.

Historical and Constitutional Context

Canada and the United States have similar systems of govern
ance with powers constitutionally distributed among the executive;
legislative, and judicial branches of government.29 In the United
States, powers are apportioned between the federal government
and its constituent states,3° while in Canada the division of powers
between the federal government and the provinces and territories is
also constitutionally established. 31 The Canadian and United States
constitutions not only outline the separation of powers, but also
contain fundamental protections that limit the actions of govern
ment officials against individuals. 32 These constitutional rights are
particularly important in the criminal context and include the acqui
26. See Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L.
581, 605 (1979) [hereinafter White, Police Trickery].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III; Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., ch. 3 (U.K.),
as reprinted in RS.C., No.5 (Appendix 1985).
30. U.S. CONST. amend X. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not dele
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
31. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., eh. 3 (U.K.) §§ 91, 92, as reprinted in
RS.C., No.5 (Appendix 1985).
32. See generally U.S. CONST.; Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., eh. 3 (U.K.),
as reprinted in RS.C., No.5 (Appendix 1985).
REV.
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sition of inculpatory statements from an accused by law enforce
ment officers.
The United States Bill of Rights was enacted in 1791 and con
tains an array of individual rights limiting the power of the federal
government. 33 The Bill of Rights did not, however, affect the con
duct of authorities in individual states or the ways in which such
government actors procured incriminating statements until the
twentieth century.34 During the nineteenth century, United States
courts started to apply the common law confession rule, which
originated under British jurisprudence, to determine whether in
criminating statements made by an accused to persons in authority
should be excluded if the statements were made involuntarily.35
Courts examined the reliability of the statements and whether they
were procured free from threats or inducements, but did not focus
on whether the methods used were unfair. 36
During the late nineteenth century, the United States common
law confession rule acquired a constitutional dimension. 37 This was
later merged with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1936.38 The United States Supreme Court's appli
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause gradu
33. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
34. See {nfra text accompanying notes 42-44.
35. British authorities first developed the common law confession rule in the
eighteenth century. See The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35 (K.B.
1783). American authorities began applying the rule in the nineteenth century. See
Commonwealth v. Chabbock, 1 Mass. (I Will.) 144 (1804), overruled in part by Com
monwealth v. Carr, 373 Mass. 617 (1977). The United States Supreme Court decided its
first case applying the common law confessions rule in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574
(1884), abrogated on other grounds by Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). For
an overview of the development of the common law confession rule in the United
States, see Richard A. Leo et aI., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 479, 488-90.
36. This began to change during the mid-twentieth century. See discussion infra
note 40.
37. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897), abrogated by Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). In Bram, the Court stated:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is con
trolled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
38. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (use of confession as basis
of conviction violated defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights). The Fourteenth
Amendment reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
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ally shifted from focusing on whether evidence was reliably
obtained to examining whether the methods used to obtain the evi
dence were fundamentally fair. 39 Still, in order for the courts to
determine that due process was violated, the police methods em
ployed needed to be sufficiently egregious to warrant their exclu
sion. 40 Confessions obtained through police methods that fell short
of being considered highly offensive would still be admitted, and,
thus, the Court's due process jurisprudence failed to substantially
curb overreaching state conduct. 41
During the mid-twentieth century, the United States Supreme
Court began to apply certain portions of the Bill of Rights to the
actions of state authorities by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend
ment. 42 This selective incorporation process applied the Fifth
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
39. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952), overruled in part by Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
40. See id. In Rochin, police ordered a doctor to extract two capsules from the
defendant's stomach. Id. at 166. Doctors forcibly inserted a tube into Rochin's stom
ach and released a substance that induced Rochin to throw up two morphine capsules.
Id. The Court likened this method to obtaining a confession from a defendant by the
use of physical abuse, and held that even where inculpatory statements were indepen
dently established as true, "coerced confessions offend[ed] the community's sense of
fair play and decency." Id. at 167, 173.
41. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), abrogated by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Crooker, the majority held that due process was not
violated and admitted a confession into evidence even though police continued to inter
rogate Crooker despite his request to see his lawyer. Id. at 434. But see Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). In Spano, the Court determined that Spano's due process
rights were violated when, after being formally charged for murder, the prosecutor and
several police officers, one of whom was an old childhood friend, interrogated Spano
for roughly eight hours despite Spano's persistent requests to speak with his lawyer.
The Court held that Spano's "will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sym
pathy falsely aroused, after considering all the facts in their post-indictment setting."
Id. at 323.
For further commentary on the application of the due process test to confessions,
see Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United
States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209, 1209-11 (1980) [hereinafter White, Interroga
tion Without Questions]; White, Police Trickery, supra note 26, at 593-96. Professor
Yale Kamisar has also noted that the safeguards provided by the Court's totality of the
circumstances test were largely illUSOry. Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness"
Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1996), reprinted in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFES
SIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 41, 43 (1980).
42. The applicable portion of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. During the middle of the twentieth century, the Court,
through its doctrine of selective incorporation, made certain provisions of the Bill of
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Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause and the Sixth Amend
ment's Right-to-Counsel provision to confessions obtained by im
proper state action. 43 When courts determine that police have used
methods to obtain evidence in violation of the accused's constitu
tional rights, the evidence may be excluded. 44
Canada's juridical experience with constitutional protections
has been considerably shorter than that of the United States. Ca
nada became a largely self-governing state with the passage of the
British North America Act in 1867. This Act, however, did not in
clude a body of codified individual legal rights akin to those found
in the United States Bill of Rights. 45 Since 1867, the common law
confession rule 46 and other statutory protections, such as those in
cluded in the Canadian Bill of Rights,47 have provided Canadian
defendants with the sort of protections guaranteed by the United
States Bill of Rights. 48 These legal norms, however, failed to suffi
ciently protect the rights of individual citizens against overreaching
Rights applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Through this doc
trine, the Supreme Court and other courts began to apply the important protections
found in the Bill of Rights to both federal and state criminal cases. See, e.g., Gideon v.
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
43. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,7-8 (1964) (self-incrimination); Gideon, 372
U.S. at 340-45 (right to counsel).
44. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-401, 406 n.12 (1977) (stating
that defendant's self-incriminating statements, acquired in the absence of counsel, could
not constitutionally be admitted into evidence). Appellate courts have applied various
doctrines such as the "harmless error doctrine" to allow evidence otherwise acquired
through unconstitutional means. See, e.g., State v. LePage, 630 P.2d 674 (Idaho 1981).
In LePage, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the accused's Sixth Amendment rights
were violated when a state agent deliberately elicited incriminating statements from
him. Id. at 683-84. The court held, however, that the admission of the evidence was
harmless error as the jury would have arrived at the same verdict had the evidence been
excluded. See id.
45. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31, Viet., ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in RS.C.,
No.5 (Appendix 1985); see also Bruce E. Shemrock, Infancy and Maturity: A Compari
son of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the United States Constitution,
3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMPo L. 915, 916 (1997) (noting that individual rights were not
addressed in the British North America Act).
46. See Ibrahim V. The King, [1914] A.c. 599 (P.c. 1914) (appeal taken from
H.K.), available at 1914 WL 18406. In Ibrahim, the Privy Council stated that "no state
ment by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shewn by the
prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not been ob
tained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out
by a person in authority." Id. at 609; see also R V. Rothman, [1981]1 S.C.R 640 (Can.
1981), available at 1981 CarswellOnt 43 (Westlaw).
47. Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 S.c., ch. 44 (Can.).
48. See Shemrock, supra note 45, at 916.
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state conduct. 49 This changed with the passage of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (Charter), a body of constitutionally en
shrined legal rights enacted in 1982. 50 The Charter applies to the
actions of federal, provincial, territorial, and local government ac
tors. 51 Evidence obtained through unconstitutional means is not
immediately excluded; a party seeking to exclude the evidence must
further satisfy the requirements of s. 24(2) of the Charter. 52 Absent
some coercive conduct by the state that would render a defendant's
incriminating statements involuntary, the Canadian common law
confession rule permitted evidence to be admitted where an under
cover state agent elicited incriminating statements from an accused
during cell-plant interrogations. 53 Following the Charter's adop
tion, the Supreme Court of Canada placed limitations on whether

49. The Canadian Bill of Rights was an act of Parliament that granted individuals
many of the same rights that would appear in the Charter twenty-two years later. ROB
ERT J. SHARPE ET AL., THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 16-17 (2d ed. 2002).
However, the Canadian Bill of Rights was deemed to have two key shortcomings that
limited its impact. Id. at 17. First, it only applied to federal laws and federal actors and
not to the laws or actions of provincial or local governments. Id. Second, many judges
were reluctant to find other challenged parliamentary statutes to be violative of the
Canadian Bill of Rights because they were not part of Canada's constitutional law. Id.;
see also PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUllONAL LAW OF CANADA 699-701 (2004) (discuss
ing the application of the Canadian Bill of Rights to federal laws and inconsistent fed
eral statutes).
50. See SHARPE ET AL., supra note 49, at 1-2, 45-46.
51. Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 32, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.); see also HOGG, supra note 49,
at 758.
52. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 24(2) ("Where, in proceed
ings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner
that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evi
dence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances,
the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute."). In R. v. Collins, the Supreme Court of Canada enunciated three factors to
assist courts in determining whether evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2). R. v.
Collins (1987) 1 S.c.R. 265, '!I'll 46-50 (Can. 1987), available at 1987 Carswell BC 94
(Westlaw). The first factor looks at whether the defendant's constitutional rights or
freedoms were infringed upon or denied. Id. <JI<JI 26,32-34. The second factor relates to
the impact of the admission of the illegally obtained evidence on the fairness of the
trial. Id. <JI 47. The third factor is concerned with the impact that excluding the evidence
would have on the repute of the administration of justice. Id. <JI<JI 50-51; see also R. v.
Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, '!I'll 49-56 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 CarswellAlta 212
(Westlaw); R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151, '!I'll 144-46 (Can. 1990), available at 1990
CarswellYukon 7 (Westlaw). See generally DAVID PACIOCCO & LEE STUESSER, THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 273-312 (3d ed. 2002).
53. R. v. Rothman, [1981] 1 S.c.R. 640, <JI<JI 51-53 (Can. 1981), available at 1981
CarswellOnt 43 (Westlaw).
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the State could use such methods to elicit incriminating statements
under s. 7's right to silence. 54
Canadian courts apply a "purposive" approach to interpreting
Charter provisions, including the right to silence. 55 A purposive
analysis of specific Charter provisions looks to the broader objec
tives that underlie the provisions in question. 56 In Hebert, the
Court looked to the underlying values that the right to silence was
designed to protect and identified several key principles upon
which it based its decision.57 The Court stated that the broad pur
pose of the rights enshrined in ss. 7 through 14 of the Charter was
"to preserve the rights of the detained individual, and to maintain
the repute and integrity of [the] system of justice. "58 With respect
to the right to silence more specifically, the Court identified in gen
eral terms the asymmetric power relationship between the state and
a suspect whom the state has confined. 59 This fundamental imbal
ance permits the state to exercise its superior power to intrude on
the individual's physical freedom by detaining her, thus leaving the
54. Hebert, [1990] 2 s.c.R. 151. Hebert effectively overruled the Rothman deci
sion on its facts. Id. <JI 116; see also Michael Brown, The American Approach to Cell
Statements Makes Good Sense, in Hebert: A Constitutional Right to Silence-Two Com
ments, 77 C.R.3d 1!J4, 1!J5 (1990) (stating that "[i]n overruling ... Rothman the Su
preme Court of Canada has elevated the common law right to silence to a constitutional
right under section 7 of the Charter"); David M. Tanovich, The Charter Right to Silence
and the Unchartered Waters of a New Voluntary Confession Rule, 9 C.RAth 24, 25
(1992) ("Hebert has effectively overturned Rothman.").
55. Hunter v. Southam, Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, <JI<JI 18-20 (Can. 1984), available
at 1984 Carswell Alta 412 (West law). In Hunter, the Court enunciated a fundamental
"purposive" approach to interpreting constitutional provisions including the legal rights
of suspects subject to criminal investigations. Id. The Hunter Court stated that the
constitution must "be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social,
political and historical realities often un imagined by its framers." Id. <JI 16. In Hunter,
the Court specifically examined the underlying principles upon which the s. 8 "unrea
sonable search and seizure" provisions were predicated, rather than merely determining
the meaning of "reasonable" in the context of the provision. DON STUART, CHARTER
JUSTICE IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 5 (3d ed. 2001). Also, in R. v. Brydges, the Court
applied the purposive approach when holding that the police had a duty under the right
to counsel provision of s. 10(b) to inform an accused that she could consult legal aid
after she had expressed doubt as to whether she could afford legal counsel. R. v.
Brydges, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1990, <JI 13 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 CarswellAlta 3
(Westlaw). The Court stated that s. 10 was purposively aimed '''at fostering the princi
ples of adjudicative fairness,' one of which is 'the concern for fair treatment of an ac
cused person.'" Id. (quoting R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.c.R. 383, <JI<JI 23, 24 (Can. 1986),
available at 1986 CarswellNB 14 (Westlaw».
56. Hunter, [1984] 2 S.c.R. 145, <JI 18.
57. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, <JI<JI 118-23.
58. Id. <JI 20.
59. [d. <JI<JI 120-21.
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suspect unable to simply walk away.60 The Court posited that
"[t]his physical intrusion on the individual's mental liberty in turn
may enable the state to infringe the individual's mental liberty by
techniques made possible by its superior resources and power. "61
This principle notwithstanding, the Hebert Court also acknowl
edged that s. 7 requires an inherent and critical balancing of inter
ests between the state and the individua1. 62 The Court advanced
that the state has a legitimate interest in performing its law enforce
ment duties and is permitted to deprive the suspect of her rights,
provided it comports with the principles of "fundamental justice. "63
In Canada and the United States, investigative techniques that
were once permissible are now constitutionally restricted by s. 7's
right to silence and the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. The
next section of this Article discusses the scope of these protections
in the context of cell-plant interrogations.
B.

Textual Language of the Constitutional Provisions

The discussion surrounding the scope of s. 7 and the Sixth
Amendment must begin with a review of the textual language of
these constitutional protections. Section 7 states that "[ e]veryone
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice."64 Textually, the temporal and spatial as
pects of s. 7's protections (that is, when and where they are opera
tive) are not confined to criminal matters or trials. 65 Furthermore,
fundamental justice is a seemingly broad notion that the Supreme
Court of Canada has interpreted to include the concepts of both
procedural fairness as well as substantive fairness. 66
60. Id.
61. Id. 1120.
62. Id. 1 121.
63. Id.
64. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
65. Indeed, s. 7 has also been applied to civil matters. See, e.g., New Brunswick
Minister of Health & Cmty. Servs. v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.c.R. 46 (Can. 1999), available at
1999 CarswellNB 305 (Westlaw); B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Soc'y of Metro. Toronto,
[1995] 1 S.c.R. 315 (Can. 1995), available at 1995 CarswellOnt 105 (Westlaw).
66. In a notable 1985 case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that fundamental
justice incorporated not only the notion of procedural justice, but that of substantive
fairness. See Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.c.R. 486 (Can. 1985), available at
1985 CarswellBC 398 (Westlaw). As certain scholars point out, there were assumptions
at the time the Charter was promulgated that the concept of fundamental justice was
restricted to procedural justice. See SHARPE ET AL., supra note 49, at 185.
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The Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel Clause provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
... have the assistance of counsel for his defense."67 Unlike the
broad language of s. 7, the entire Sixth Amendment seems specifi
cally to refer to the rights of a defendant in the context of criminal
trials, and, notably, not to interrogations, surreptitious or otherwise,
which take place outside of trial. 68 From a temporal perspective,
the text of the Sixth Amendment seems limited to the period of the
court proceedings surrounding the prosecution of the accused,
while spatially, it would appear that the protection is effective in
court, but not outside of trial.
Juxtaposing s. 7 and the Sixth Amendment, it becomes imme
diately noticeable that from a strictly textual vantage point, the for
mer provides an accused with potentially more protection than the
latter because s. 7 is not textually confined to criminal proceedings
and to the rights of the accused during trial. 69 Thus, one might nat
urally assume that s. 7 would potentially provide a greater degree of
protection for an accused subject to cell-plant interrogations. Juris
prudence, however, demonstrates otherwise.
C.

Temporal and Spatial Scope of Protections

Canadian and United States jurisprudence have provided a
greater depth of understanding to the temporal and spatial scopes
of the s. 7 right to silence and Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Turning first to the Sixth Amendment, the right to counsel becomes
operative upon the initiation of formal criminal proceedings with
respect to a particular crime. 70 Formal proceedings may be initi
ated "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, in
formation, or arraignment,"71 and does not begin prior to any of
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
68. [d. The full text of the Sixth Amendment reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
[d. (emphases added). Read in its entirety, the language makes specific references to
the rights afforded to an accused at her criminal trial.
69. See SHARPE ET AL., supra note 49, at 179-80.
70. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 177 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) (quoting Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)). In Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008), the
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these events.72 Thus, if an undercover police officer were to elicit
incriminating statements from an accused prior to the commence
ment of formal proceedings with respect to the crime for which in
criminating statements were elicited, the Sixth Amendment would
not apply and the statements would be admissible. 73
The temporal limitation of the Sixth Amendment's application
to post-formal proceeding questioning notwithstanding, its spatial
scope is limitless; it is not confined, for example, to questioning that
takes place within a judicial proceeding or by police officers during
a custodial interrogation in a detention settingJ4 Where an agent
of the state elicits incriminating statements from an accused in a
Court held that a defendant's initial appearance before a magistrate judge activates the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel protection. This is so even where the prosecutor is
neither present during this appearance nor even aware that it is taking place. Id. A
Federal Court of Appeals has held that formal proceedings commenced when the de
fendant was charged with a complaint rather than by indictment. See Manning v. Bow
ersox, 310 F.3d 571, 575 (8th Cir. 2002).
72. But cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). In Escobedo, the
Court determined that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel applied even prior to
the commencement of formal proceedings when an investigation was no longer a gen
eral inquiry into an unsolved crime and had begun to focus on a particular individual.
Id. This decision preceded Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and once Miranda
was decided two years later, Escobedo was effectively sidelined as a precedent for pro
viding suspects with protections during a police interrogation. See Yale Kamisar,
Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda' What Is "Interrogation?" When Does it Mat
ter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1,26 (1978) (noting that Escobedo was quickly "shoved offstage" by
Miranda). Furthermore, Escobedo's extension into the pre-formal proceedings period
does not seem to have been followed by subsequent Court decisions. See, e.g., Fellers,
540 U.S. 519 (providing examples of subsequent cases where the Court explicitly reaf
firmed that the Sixth Amendment applied only once formal proceedings had attached);
Brewer, 430 U.S. 387 (same).
73. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990). This unfortunate restriction
on scope may have unfair results. For example, if an undercover state agent were to
take active steps to elicit incriminating statements from an accused by asking a series of
questions normally asked in a non-undercover interrogation, such conduct would result
in a Sixth Amendment violation if the conduct took place after formal proceedings had
commenced. However, were the very same interrogation to take place prior to the
commencement of formal proceedings, the statements would be admitted.
74. See, e.g., Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524-25. This is distinct from the Fifth Amend
ment Miranda protections embedded within the Self-Incrimination Clause. See Mi
randa, 384 U.S. 436. In Miranda, the Court stated that "[b]y custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
at 444. In a subsequent decision, the Court further clarified that "the term 'interroga
tion' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote
omitted).
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location such as a co-defendant's car,75 a police informant's house,76
or in the accused's home,77 such deliberate acts of elicitation will
still likely be found in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
The s. 7 right to silence, despite its seemingly broad textual
language, has been restricted by the Supreme Court of Canada. 78
Within the context of cell-plant interrogations, the right to silence is
effective, both temporally and spatially, only after an accused is
placed into detention 79 and remains in effect for the duration of the
accused's confinement. 8o The spatial limitation in the s. 7 jurispru
dence seems inconsistent in light of the Charter's broad language,
75. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203, 206 (1964).
76. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S 159, 167 (1985) (noting that "[a]t the trial, the
State did not offer into evidence anything from the recorded telephone conversations,
but did offer portions of the tapes of the December 26 meeting, principally those in
volving direct discussion of the thefts for which Moulton was originally indicted"); see
also Brief of Respondent at *7, Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S 159 (1985) (No. 84-786),
1985 WL 667858.
77. Fellers, 540 U.S. at 521, 524-25.
78. See R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 'll'lI 129-33 (Can. 1990), available at 1990
Carswell Yukon 7 (Westlaw). This is not surprising for the courts must then naturally
balance the rights of the state against those of an individual whose rights have been
deprived under s. 7. Id. 'll'lI 121, 128.
79. Id. 'lI13l. The right to silence does not then extend to undercover operations
prior to detention where a suspect, whether under indictment or otherwise, makes in
criminating statements to state agents, even where such statements have been actively
elicited. See id.; see also id. 'lI 31 ("Prior to the time that an adversary relationship
exists between the state and the individual, the right to remain silent has not attached
and undercover police work may proceed unhindered."). Notably, this is substantially
the same limitation that applies to the s. 10 right-to-counsel provision. Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, §lO(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) ("Everyone has the right on arrest or detention ...
to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right ...."). For
a discussion on s. 10, see STUART, supra note 55, at 284-306.
80. Cell-plant interrogations take place while suspects are incarcerated and,
therefore, are clearly in detention. However, detention, at least in the context of other
Charter rights such as the s. lO(b) right to counsel, can take place outside of incarcera
tion. For instance, in R. v. Thomsen, the Court determined that an individual who was
required to submit to a roadside breathalyzer test was detained for s. 10 purposes. R. v.
Thomsen, [1988] 1 S.c.R. 640, 'lI 17 (Can. 1988), available at 1988 CarswellOnt 53
(Westlaw). However, it is unclear whether an individual who is the subject of a surrep
titious interrogation by an undercover state agent while not incarcerated, but neverthe
less confined in some way, is in detention for s. 7 purposes. As recently as 2007, the
Ontario Court of Appeal stated that it was conceivable that an individual might not be
in detention, but still may remain subject to state control in circumstances functionally
equivalent to detention. See R. v. Osmar, 84 O.R.3d 321, 'lI 42 (Ont. A.c. 2007) (Can.),
available at 2007 CarswellOnt 339 (Westlaw). Yet the court did not provide any exam
ples of what such circumstances might be. See id. It is not out of the realm of possibil
ity, for example, to contemplate a scenario where a suspect who is arrested and
confined in a police car following arrest is in detention for s. 7 purposes. In such a
scenario, the police could feasibly place in the car with the accused an undercover of
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which seeks to limit government deprivations of life, liberty, and
security, except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice. 81
The spatial limitations imposed by the Supreme Court of Ca
nada on the right to silence, despite the broad language of s. 7, may
be reasonable. The importance of the right to silence (and the right
to counsel) in the context of the cell-plant interrogations is clear:
the accused is subject to the coercive pressures inherent to custody
and has no power to choose with whom she will be confined. 82 For
example, individuals who have no experience being incarcerated
are particularly vulnerable in such situations to cell-plant interroga
tions. Law enforcement authorities can place informants or under
cover officers into a jail cell who will manipulate an accused into
making inculpatory statements. By engaging in jailhouse bravado,
the accused may be cajoled into responding in kind with her own
recitation of illicit deeds or risk losing face. Where an accused is
surreptitiously interrogated outside of custody, she is not subjected
to the same coercive pressures as someone confined by the state.
This is contrasted with the situation of an accused released on bail
because this individual is free to choose whom she speaks with
about her alleged crimes. Therefore, while the spatial limitation of
the right to silence might not seem to comport with the broad lan
guage of s. 7, it is arguably a reasonable limitation because custody
presents heightened dangers and an increased power imbalance be
tween the state and the accused.

ficer, who is pretending to be someone who has also been arrested, who then subjects
the accused to an interrogation or its functional equivalent.
81. See supra note 79. In an article written prior to the Hebert decision, Professor
Patrick Healy argued that a constitutional right to silence should be embedded within s.
7 as opposed to s. 10(b), for the latter would limit the right to silence to detention and
arrest. See Patrick Healy, The Value of Silence, 74 C.R.3d 176, 180 (1990). Given that
the text of s. 7 does not specifically limit its effect to instances of arrest or detention, the
Hebert Court could have extended the right to silence to periods not encapsulated by
detention. See id.; see also Gordon Wall, Doubts Cast on Hebert Limits on the Pre- Trial
Right to Silence, 36 C.R.4th 134, 142 (1995) ("On the proper facts, the Supreme Court
should have no hesitation in abandoning the detention limit and exceeding the right to
silence to any person questioned by the police regarding an offence which the person is
suspected of having committed."). However, the Court has not yet abandoned its de
tention limitation. See Patrick Healy, The Right to Remain Silent: Value Added, But
How Much?, in Hebert· A Constitutional Right to Silence-Two Comments, supra note
54, at 200-01.
82. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of these issues.
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Subject Matter Scope of the Protections

The Sixth Amendment's right to counsel provision is "offense
specific."83 As the United States Supreme Court reiterated in Texas
v. Cobb, the right to counsel only excludes incriminating statements
procured through unlawful interrogations related to crimes for
which formal proceedings have been initiated. 84 Therefore, if an
accused is indicted for robbery, and the police conduct a cell-plant
interrogation using an informant who elicits incriminating state
ments about the robbery, those statements will be excluded from
evidence. However, if the informant also elicits statements regard
ing a murder that the accused committed during the same robbery,
but for which formal proceedings had not yet been initiated, such
statements regarding the murder would not be excluded. This is
true regardless of the fact that the murder took place during the
robbery and was factually related to the robbery.8s
In contrast, nothing in the Supreme Court of Canada's cell
plant decisions specifically limits the application of the right to si
lence to the crimes for which the individuals are arrested or
charged. From a policy perspective, the right to silence should not
be so limited. Unlike the Sixth Amendment, s. 7 is not limited to
criminal prosecutions where the state has brought formal charges
against an accused. Furthermore, the pressures inherent to custo
dial environments are such that a skilled cell-plant interrogator will
assuredly extract incriminating information about other crimes to a
83. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164 (2001).
84. See id. at 167-68. However, the Court also held "that when the Sixth Amend
ment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that, even if not formally
charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test. [d. at 173.
Blockburger held that '''where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not.''' [d. (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). Generally,
the protection attaches once formal proceedings have been commenced against a defen
dant with respect to a particular offense. See id. at 167-68. Thus, police may not ques
tion a suspect with respect to a particular offense for which formal proceedings have
commenced in the absence of counsel. See id. However, the protection does not apply
where the police interrogate a suspect for a crime for which formal proceedings have
not yet been initiated. In such cases, the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination protec
tion is operative and the suspect must be "Mirandized." See id. at 17l.
85. [d. This is notably different from the Miranda protection covering any crime
the police may address during a custodial interrogation. As the Supreme Court of the
United States has stated, the Miranda protection exists "to counteract the inherent
pressures of custodial interrogation, which ... exist regardless of the number of crimes
under investigation or whether those crimes have resulted in formal charges." Arizona
v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685 (1988).
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suspect's detriment. If the fundamental principle underlying the
right to silence is the accused's right to choose not to speak to au
thorities about matters that may incriminate him, such a principle is
undermined by engaging in such legal hairsplitting. An accused
should be entitled to counsel whenever she is under arrest or de
tained by the state and questioned about any crimes for which she
may be prosecuted.

E.

Illustrating the Scope of Protection

The following hypothetical scenarios illustrate the different ap
proaches under Canadian and United States law with respect to the
spatial, temporal, and subject matter elements of the constitutional
protections in question.
1.

Hypothetical I

Albert is arrested for murder and is brought in for questioning.
He invokes both his rights to counsel and silence and refuses to
speak with the police. 86 Albert is placed in a jail cell while awaiting
his arraignment. No formal proceedings have been initiated against
Albert for any crime. The police place Randall, an undercover po
lice officer, in Albert's jail cell for a twenty-four hour period. Dur
ing that same period, Randall establishes a relationship of trust with
Albert by discussing his own alleged crimes and his connections
outside of jail. Randall suggests to Albert that his connections may
be of assistance to him. Albert, as a result of Randall's overtures,
feels comfortable sharing personal information with Randall. Seiz
ing the moment, Randall asks Albert certa,in questions that elicit
86. It should be noted that under s. 7, the Supreme Court of Canada has expressly
held that an accused does not have to invoke his right to silence prior to a cell-plant
interrogation in order for it to be operational. See R. v. Liew, [1999] 3 S.c.R. 227, 'j[<J[
44,45 (Can. 1999), available at 1999 CarswellAlta 821 (Westlaw). Although the United
States Supreme Court has not made any similar declaration with respect to the right to
counsel in the context of surreptitious interrogations, there is some precedent to suggest
it might rule similarly. See Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004). In Fellers, the
police went to the accused's home to arrest him pursuant to an arrest warrant and
following the initiation of formal judicial proceedings. Without invoking his right to
counsel, the accused made incriminating statements regarding the crime for which pro
ceedings had been initiated. Id. at 520-21. The Court held that since formal proceed
ings had attached, the statements were procured in violation of Fellers's right to
counsel. Id. at 525. According to the facts, no invocation of his right to counsel seemed
to have been made prior to his utterance of the incriminating statements. By implica
tion, it is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the absence of an invocation of the right
to counsel does not deprive such individuals of their Sixth Amendment rights, whether
in the cell-plant context or otherwise.
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incriminating responses about the crimes for which Albert has been
arrested. The incriminating information is later used by the prose
cutor against Albert.
Applying s. 7 to these facts and assuming that the state agency
and elicitation prongs are otherwise satisfied,87 the temporal and
spatial triggers of the right to silence would be satisfied. Albert was
questioned by a state agent while in detention. Had these facts
taken place in the United States, however, Albert's statements
would have been admitted into evidence at his trial. Under the
Sixth Amendment, the right to counsel would not protect Albert
from his cell plant as formal proceedings had not been initiated
against him when his statements were elicited.
2.

Hypothetical II

Assume the same basic facts as above, except that Randall is
sent in to surreptitiously interrogate Albert only after Albert has
been arraigned and has pled not guilty. Assume also that Randall
elicits incriminating statements with respect to the crime of murder
for which formal proceedings have been initiated against Albert.
Under Canadian law, Albert would still be able to successfully
prove a s. 7 violation, as the interrogation would have taken place
while he was in detention. As indicated above, the commencement
of formal adversarial judicial proceedings does not impact the ap
plication of the Charter's right to silence. Of course, Albert would
still have to show that the evidence should be excluded under s.
24(2),88 and he would likely be successful given that the evidence
obtained was conscriptive in nature. 89 Therefore the result in Hy
pothetical I would likely be the same as in Hypothetical II under
these facts with respect to the application of s. 7.
87. See infra Parts III-IV for a discussion of the state agency and elicitation
prongs.
88. For a discussion of s. 24(2), see supra note 52.
89. As the Supreme Court of Canada has stated:
[W]here ... an accused is conscripted to give evidence against himself after
clearly electing not to do so by use of an unfair trick practised by the authori
ties, and where the resultant statement is the only evidence against him, one
must surely conclude that reception of the evidence would render the trial
unfair.
R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S. C. R. 151, 'II 147 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 CarswellYukon
7 (Westlaw). Conscriptive evidence refers to evidence that persons have been com
pelled to provide against themselves. See P ACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 52, at
230-31, 365.
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However, with these facts the results under the Sixth Amend
ment would be radically different than in Hypothetical I. Here, for
mal proceedings have been initiated for the crime to which the
elicited statements referred, and Albert's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel has attached. Therefore, Albert's post-arraignment elic
ited statements would be excluded. 90
Under these facts, Albert would be able to seek protection
under both Canadian and United States constitutional law. Cana
dian and United States precedents are consonant, assuming the
state agency and elicitation prongs of each country's legal tests have
been met, when cell-plant interrogation takes place while the ac
cused is in detention and when formal proceedings have been initi
ated with respect to the crimes about which the police elicit
incriminating information.
3. Hypothetical III
Albert is arrested for murder and gives no statement to the
police. The police decide not to send in a state agent to surrepti
tiously interrogate Albert. Albert is arraigned and released on bail.
The police employ Brian, the co-defendant in Albert's case who is a
long-time friend, to elicit incriminating statements from Albert.
Brian, who is represented by different counsel, is equipped with a
wire and visits Albert at his home. In their discussions, Brian elicits
incriminating statements from Albert regarding the murder.
Under a s. 7 analysis, the conduct of the authorities in this hy
pothetical would not amount to a Charter violation as the surrepti
tious questioning took place outside of detention. 91 While Albert
would not receive protection under s. 7 based on the facts of this
hypothetical scenario, he would be protected under the spatial
scope of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel following the pre
cedent of Massiah.92 However, if Brian elicited incriminating state
90. These facts are similar to those of United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980),
in which the defendant admitted his guilt to a fellow prisoner who was a government
informant. Id. at 266. The Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
were violated when incriminating statements he made to the informant were used in his
prosecution. Id. at 272-73.
91. See, e.g., R. v. Unger, 82 Man. R.2d 244 (Man. O.B. 1992) (Can.), available at
1992 CarswellMan 336 (Westlaw).
92. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). These facts are similar to
those in Massiah, wherein the codefendant, acting as an undisclosed government agent,
elicited incriminating statements from the defendant. The Court held that the incrimi
nating statements were inadmissible as they were procured in violation of the defen
dant's right to counsel. Id. at 206.
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ments about other crimes for which formal proceedings had not yet
been initiated, those statements would not be excluded and may be
admitted into evidence at Albert's trial in accordance with Texas v.
Cobb. 93
F.

Concluding Thoughts on the Scope of Protection

The temporal, spatial, and subject matter scopes of the s. 7
right to silence provide a more balanced and practical approach to
providing rights to an accused than those of the Sixth Amendment.
Section 7 protects an accused against cell-plant interrogations dur
ing detention. It is thus operational when an accused is potentially
most vulnerable: when she first enters the detention environment
and her choice of persons to speak to is limited. At present, the
right to silence is not limited to incriminating statements respecting
crimes for which an accused has been arrested or for which formal
proceedings have commenced. It, therefore, is not an offense-spe
cific protection. Although the Sixth Amendment provides greater
spatial coverage than s. 7, it only begins after the commencement of
formal proceedings and fails to protect an accused from overreach
ing activity prior to that period. Furthermore, its protection does
not extend to other crimes, even those that are factually related to
the crime for which formal proceedings have commenced against
the accused.
III.

STATE AGENCY

In both Canada and the United States, in order to have state
ments excluded, an accused must show that they were elicited by an
agent of the state. However, each country utilizes different criteria
to determine the presence or absence of an agency relationship be
tween the state and a putative agent. The Supreme Court of Ca
nada's test looks to the material impact of the state's intervention
on the exchange between the accused and the state agent. In con
trast, United States judicial interpretations of state agency focus on
whether a contractual relationship between the informant and the
state has been created. A comparative analysis of these legal tests,
as applied to cell-plant interrogations, establishes that the Canadian
model is a preferable and more realistic approach to providing con
stitutional rights to an accused. The Canadian interpretation of
state agency is also a more purposive approach because it provides
93.

See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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greater protection to an accused, and thus significantly limits law
enforcement's ability to circumvent an accused's constitutional
rights.
A.

The General Factors: Intervention of the State v. Contractual
Relationships

To date, the United States Supreme Court has not formulated
a bright-line test to determine the existence of a state agency rela
tionship with respect to the application of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in cell-plant interrogations.94 Consequently, vari
ous state and federal courts in the United States have developed
disparate interpretations of state agency based on their understand
ing of the factual circumstances of United States v. Henry, the Su
preme Court's first cell-plant interrogation case. 95 In Henry,
federal law enforcement officers formed an agreement with Nich
ols, a jailhouse informant, who elicited incriminating statements
from the accused about his participation in an armed bank
robbery.96
The Henry Court focused on certain factors to determine that
an agency relationship existed between the state and Nichols. 97
First, Nichols was paid on a contingent-fee basis and thus would
only be paid if he produced incriminating information about
Henry.98 Lower courts are split as to whether an agreement must
be in writing. and expressly stipulate the form of remuneration in
advance or whether such agreements can be implied from the cir
cumstances without the form of compensation being offered. 99 Sec
94. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has noted,
"no 'bright line test for determining whether an individual is a Government agent for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment' has emerged." Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d
1012, 1020 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1015 (10th
Cir. 1986»; see also Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360, 1374 (Del. 1994). In Jackson, the
Delaware Supreme Court stated: '''State agent' for Sixth Amendment purposes defies
easy definition. The Supreme Court's major Sixth Amendment right to counsel opin
ions ... do not define the term, focusing instead on the method of gathering informa
tion." Id.
95. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 270.
96. [d. at 267.
97. Id. at 270.
98.

[d.
99. See Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that an
explicit agreement is not necessary). But see United States v. Malik, 680 F.2d 1162,
1165 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that an inmate who acquired information from the defen
dant, even though the inmate had previously been a paid informant for the government,
was not a state agent because the inmate's relationship with the government had been
broken off before the information was acquired); United States v. Van Scoy, 654 F.2d
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ond, although Nichols was informed by the authorities that they
were interested in receiving information about various federal de
tainees in the local jail, Henry was specifically identified as one of
these individuals. lOo This has also produced further disparities
among United States jurisdictions on the question of whether gov
ernment authorities have to identify a specific accused to its agent
prior to the agent's eliciting incriminating statements in order for a
Sixth Amendment violation to be found.
In contrast to its United States counterpart, the Supreme Court
of Canada has formulated more specific and comprehensive legal
tests to determine the existence of a state agency relationship. In
instances where undercover police officers or prison guards elicit
incriminating statements from an accused, the Court has expressly
held that such individuals are state agents for s. 7 purposes. IOI The
more challenging state agency questions arise where the incriminat
ing statements are elicited by a jailhouse informant or even by a
friend of an accused. For instance, in R. v. Broyles, the accused was
arrested and detained for the murder of his grandmother.l o2 Failing
to obtain inculpatory statements from Broyles, police persuaded
Ritter, a friend of the accused, to visit Broyles in jail. Ritter suc
cessfully elicited incriminating statements from Broyles about the
murder.l o3 Unlike typical cell-plant state agents such as undercover
police officers and jailhouse informants, Ritter was not provided
any remuneration or benefit in exchange for obtaining the
information. 104
While United States jurisprudence has focused on the exis
tence of a contractual relationship, the Broyles Court instead em
phasized the material impact that the state agency relationship must
have on the exchange between the putative state agent and the ac
cused in order for state agency to be found. lo5 It stated: "[w]ould
the exchange between the accused and the informer have taken
257,260-61 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that an inmate who was previously an informant for
the government was not a state agent at the time he acquired the incriminating informa
tion from the defendant).
100. Henry, 447 U.S. at 254 n.8.
101. See R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, 'lI 27 (Can. 1991), available at 1991
CarswellAlta 212 (Westlaw).
102. Id. 'lI 3.
103. Id. 'lI 4.
104. /d.
105. Id. 'lI 30 ("Only if the relationship between the informer and the state is such
that the exchange between the informer and the accused is materially different from
what it would have been had there been no such relationship should the informer be
considered a state agent for the purposes of the exchange.").
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place, in the form and manner in which it did take place, but for the
intervention of the state or its agents?"106 But for the state's inter
vention, the conversations between Broyles and Ritter would not
have occurred.
The Broyles Court also foresaw that even where there is no
pre-existing relationship between the state and a putative agent at
the time the elicitation takes place, there may be instances where
the state will "make it known" that it will reward an informant for
acquiring incriminating information from other inmates. 107 The
Court asserted that the test in such circumstances would be whether
"the exchange between the informer and the accused [would] have
taken place but for the inducements of the authorities."lo8 Thus,
where the state provides an inducement, such conduct may give rise
to a finding of state agency and does not allow the state to so easily
circumvent an accused's rights by asserting the absence of a formal
agreement or offer of payment in exchange for producing incrimi
nating evidence.
The following subsections discuss in greater detail the dispa
rate approaches to state agency found in United States jurispru
dence to demonstrate how the Canadian tests articulated in Broyles
may help avoid these jurisdictional splits and simultaneously ad
vance a more logical approach to constitutional protection in these
contexts.
B.

Offer of Remuneration

Rooted in the holding of the Henry decision, numerous courts
have found that the state agency prong will not be satisfied unless
there is a contractual agreement setting out the terms of remunera
tion between the state and the informant.1°9 Although in Henry,
the informant Nichols received money, courts have recognized that
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. 'lI 32.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991), overruled
on other grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated that "there is no agency absent the govern
ment's agreement to reward the informant for his services." Id. However, the York
court also stated that an agreement need not "be explicit or formal, and [can be] in
ferred from evidence that the parties behaved as though there were an agreement be
tween them, following a particular course of conduct over a sustained period of time."
Id.
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other forms of consideration can be offered. 110 Given the depriva
tions that inmates experience in confinement, there are various
types of remuneration that law enforcement officers can offer to a
willing informant to induce him to inform on another inmate.
These could include material benefits while in detention, preferen
tial treatment, or, for example, a reduced sentence. lli In United
States v. Sampat, an informant employed by the state was given
probation in exchange for providing information about the ac
cused,112 As the Sampat court noted, freedom is "a commodity
more precious than money."113
Whatever the form of remuneration, some United States courts
require that the consideration be expressly offered at the outset. 114
This effectively requires that an accused prove that law enforce
ment officers formalized an agreement with an informant prior to
the elicitation. Consequently, law enforcement could easily circum
vent the creation of an agency relationship by simply mentioning to
an informant its interest in receiving information about a given ac
cused without formally offering any compensation to the
informant. lls
Other federal and state courts have found that implied con
tracts between an informant and law enforcement are sufficient to
create an agency relationship,116 even where the compensation is
not expressly offered,117 Indeed, when the state creates an expecta
tion in the informant that he will receive some remuneration, such
action should be sufficient to find an agency relationship,118 In
110. See, e.g., United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that
the informant apparently acted "on the reasonable assumption that government offi
cials were aware of his actions and would reward him in the future, if not presently, with
a recommendation for a reduction in his sentence").
111. [d. at 423 n.5.
112. United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 634-36 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
113. [d. at 638.
114. Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1020-21 (11th Cir. 1987); Thomas v.
Cox, 708 F.2d 132, 134-36 (4th Cir. 1983); State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 966 (Conn.
2004); Commonwealth v. Rancourt, 503 N.E.2d 960, 963-64 (Mass. 1987).
115. See Maia Goodell, Government Responsibility for the Acts ofJailhouse Infor
mants Under the Sixth Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2525, 2547 (2003) (noting that
"[r]efusing to consider more informal agreements ignores the reality of these arrange
ments, where an implication can carry as much force as an explicit promise").
116. Randolph v. California, 380 FJd 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004); Commonwealth
v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1120 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265,
1270-71 (Pa. 1992).
117. See supra note 109.
118. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated, "[i]n the absence of a reward,
whether it be pecuniary in nature or in the form of an agreement to testify [favorably]
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United States v. Brink, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit noted that the informant, Scott, may have informed
on the accused because he reasonably believed that he would re
ceive a reduced sentence. 119 The court observed that the govern
ment had trained Scott to be an informant and advised him that his
cooperation would be reported to the United States Attorney and
the Attorney General. 120 After Scott began his duties as an inform
ant, he was placed in a jail cell with the accused and was later ap
proached by a state trooper who asked if Brink had given any
information about his alleged crime. 121 Scott informed the trooper
about Brink's incriminating statements, which were admitted at
triaJ.122 The Brink court concluded that, given Scott's "propensity
to act" as an informant and his placement in the cell with the ac
cused, it was reasonable to infer a deliberate effort by the state to
obtain incriminating information, notwithstanding that Scott was
never specifically offered any remuneration at the outset. 123
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that an informant's cooperation rendered him a state
agent even absent an explicit agreement. In Randolph v. Califor
nia, the informant, Moore, elicited incriminating statements from
the accused, Randolph, a developmentally disabled inmate with an
IQ of fifty-nine. 124 The prosecutor and police officer who were in
terested in receiving incriminating information about Randolph ex
plicitly told Moore not to expect anything in exchange for his
testimony,125 The Ninth Circuit determined that although he was
not offered any specific remuneration, "[I]t is clear that Moore
hoped to receive leniency and that, acting on that hope, he cooper
ated with the State."126 The court held that:
an explicit agreement to compensate Moore is not necessary to a
finding that Moore acted as an agent of the State. There is suffi
regarding the informant's assistance to the police, there would be no incentive for infor
mants to aid law enforcement agencies." Franciscus, 710 A.2d at 1120.
119. United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3rd Cir. 1994); see supra note 110.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. [d. at 421.
123. /d. at 424.
124. Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004). That Randolph
was developmentally disabled would seem to be another compelling reason why the
Sixth Amendment should have been applied more vigorously. He was likely more vul
nerable to the ploys of skilled jailhouse operatives seeking to elicit incriminating
statements.
125. [d.
126. Id.
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cient undisputed evidence to show that the State made a con
scious decision to obtain Moore's cooperation and that Moore
consciously decided to provide that cooperation. That coopera
tion rendered Moore an agent of the State. 127
Both Brink and Randolph represent the most realistic and pur
posive judicial approaches to the creation of agency relationships.
Henry demonstrated that the state could not circumvent an ac
cused's right to counsel once formal proceedings had commenced
by surreptitiously interrogating a defendant who was unaware that
an interrogation was occurring.128 To define state agency narrowly,
as some United States courts have done, effectively permits law en
forcement officials to circumvent the spirit of the Henry protection.
Yet even if most courts were to follow the Randolph and Brink
approaches to this aspect of state agency, they would still not en
compass situations in which the state is assisted by friends or family
members of an accused who procure inculpatory statements with
neither promise nor expectation of compensation for such coopera
tion. In so doing, the state acts in a surreptitious manner by seeking
to obtain information through deceptive means that it could not ob
tain through regular police interrogation procedures. Furthermore,
in deploying a friend or family member, the state exploits a rela
tionship of trust between the accused and an agent from whom an
inmate, given her confinement, is likely to seek solace. Therefore,
the Canadian approach under Broyles offers greater protection to a
vulnerable accused than the United States approach, even under
Brink and Randolph.
C.

Government Instructions to Target a Specific Accused

An agency relationship typically involves the existence of a
principal who exercises control over its agents' actions.12 9 In the
context of cell-plant interrogations, United States courts are di
vided about the degree to which such control needs to be mani
fested. 130 This division turns on whether state authorities need to
127. [d.
128. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) ("Agency is the fidu
ciary relationship that arises when one person (a "principal") manifests assent to an
other person (an "agent") that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject
to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to
act.").
130. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 918 (8th CiT. 2003); United
States v. LaB are, 191 F.3d 60 (1st CiT. 1999); United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342 (2d
CiT. 1997).
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instruct an informant to elicit information from a particular accused
or if the informant can act as an agent-at-Iarge.13 1 Courts in some
jurisdictions hold that a specific targeting requirement is necessary
to prove a Sixth Amendment violation.132 At the same time, other
courts have found such distinctions inconsequential.1 33
Contractual relationships between the state and an informant
may be established in writing or implied from the circumstances. 134
However, even where such agreements are written, they might not
state the name of the individual about whom the informant is ex
pected to obtain information. The recognition of an agency rela
tionship should not depend on whether the name of the accused has
been brought to the informant's attention, but instead whether the
agent is engaged in obtaining incriminating information in further
ance of the principal's prosecutorial and investigatory interests. 135
Nevertheless, some courts have found that even where a written
agreement creates an agency relationship, the agreement should
also provide the names of specific individuals about whom informa
131. Once again, this ambiguity arises from the United States Supreme Court's
lack of clear parameters in defining agency. While the facts in both Massiah and Henry
involved law enforcement officials expressly pointing out the accused to their inform
ant, nothing in those decisions called for a targeting requirement as a matter of law. See
Henry, 447 U.S. at 268; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 202-03 (1984). As Maia
Goodell asserts,
[tJhe underlying rationale for the Massiah and Henry line of cases does not
support a targeting requirement. Both the pursuit of truth and the normative
authority of the criminal court require that the defendants not be subject to
questioning by undercover government informants at large, with free rein to
question them in the absence of counsel.
Goodell, supra note 115, at 2541. Furthermore, in Henry, Justice Blackmun observed
that "Henry was only one of several federal detainees to whom Nichols was to pay
attention; this is not a case in which officers singled out a specific target." Henry, 447
U.S. at 285-286 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
132. See, e.g., Johnson, 338 F.3d at 921-23; LaBare, 191 F.3d at 65; Birbal, 113
F.3d at 345-46.
133. United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Whether the
principal exercises its control strictly, by targeting specific individuals, or casually, by
loosing an informant on the prison population at large is irrelevant."), overruled on
other grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Common
wealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 39 (Mass. 2007). Goodell argues that "either an
agreement with the informant to provide information about fellow inmates or the
targeting of a particular defendant is sufficient to show that the government is responsi
ble for the informant's questioning ...." Goodell, supra note 115, at 2531.
134. See supra notes 106-127 and accompanying text.
135. Goodell asserts that "[o]nce an informant becomes a state agent, pursuant to
an agreement to collect information, her actions weigh in on the government side
particularly in the case of the informant at large."Goodell, supra note 115, at 2538-39.
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tion should be obtained.1 36 For instance, in United States v. Birbal,
the state entered into a plea agreement with an informant,
Gabaree, who was to provide "any and all information in his pos
session relating directly or indirectly to any and all criminal activi
ties or other matters of which he has knowledge."137 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that in the ab
sence of a provision in the agreement to provide information about
Birbal specifically, Gabaree was not acting as a state agent but as an
independent entrepreneur when he elicited incriminating state
ments from the accused. 138
The Second Circuit's decision in Birbal stands in stark contrast
to the decisions reached by the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Sampol139 and the Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Murphy.1 40 In
both Sampol and Murphy, law enforcement officials entered into
written plea agreements with informants who would provide in
criminating information about other inmates.1 41 Although these
agreements did not name the specific individuals to be targeted,
both courts held that the informants were state agents whose elici
tations of incriminating statements amounted to Sixth Amendment
violations.1 42 The Murphy court expressly determined that a target
ing requirement was unnecessary under the Supreme Court's
precedents. 143
Murphy and Sampol are consonant with the protective nature
of the Sixth Amendment as well as the Henry decision. Informants
at-large are clearly motivated to obtain incriminating information
and do not require police to instruct them to inform on a particular
subject. Jails are filled with individuals awaiting trial who are vul
nerable to informants seeking to elicit information from them that
136.
137.
138.

See, e.g., Birbat, 113 F.3d 342.
Id. at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 346.

139. United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
140. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30 (Mass. 2007).
141. Sampot, 636 F.2d at 632-34; Murphy, 862 N.E.2d at 34.
142. Sampot, 636 F.2d at 636-38; Murphy, 862 N.E.2d at 46. Murphy was signifi
cant because, although the agreement was with federal agents, the information was used
by state prosecutors. See Murphy, 862 N.E.2d at 35. On appeal, the Commonwealth
argued that because the informant's agreement was with the federal government, he
was not an agent of the Commonwealth. Id. The court's holding is an important elabo
ration of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in that an agency relationship between an
informant and federal government authorities can be imputed to state authorities, and,
presumably, vice versa. See id.
143. Murphy, 862 N.E. 2d at 39.
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can be used at trial. In order to properly protect inmates from the
state's circumvention of their Sixth Amendment rights, all jurisdic
tions in the United States should find an agency relationship where
law enforcement officials form agreements with their agents, writ
ten or otherwise, without specifying a specific accused.
Some prosecutors and police officers develop significant rela
tionships with jailhouse informants where the latter are regularly
rewarded for providing incriminating information about other in
mates, even in the absence of any formal agreement identifying a
targeted defendant. 144 In United States v. Johnson, the prosecutor
made a concerted effort to place a notorious defendant in the same
detention facility with his prized informant, McNeese, with the spe
cific intent that McNeese would elicit incriminating statements from
her. 145 The prosecutor never communicated to McNeese that he
wanted information about Johnson.1 46 Nevertheless, just as ex
pected, McNeese established a friendly rapport with Johnson and
was able to garner her trust, leading to her making incriminating
statements to him.147 The Eighth Circuit, viewing the factual tab
leau narrowly, determined that there was no state agency relation
ship, and thus no Sixth Amendment violation. 148
Juxtaposed against the holding in Johnson is the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Commonwealth v. Moose. 149 In
Moose, the district attorney established an ongoing relationship
with an informant named Oglesby who had been incarcerated in a
county jail for three years while awaiting sentencing.1 50 The Com
monwealth delayed sentencing each time Oglesby produced a new
confession. 151 Although the district attorney never gave Oglesby
144. Goodell states: "When government officials encourage an inmate to collect
information from jailmates, they deputize an informant at large, commissioning him to
gather information from those the government is forbidden by the Sixth Amendment to
question out of the presence of counsel." Goodell, supra note 115, at 2538.
145. United States v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 918, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2003).
146. /d. at 92l.
147. Id. at 919-20.
148. /d. at 919. Daniel Kirsch notes that the Johnson decision
severely limits a defendant's protections against the government's intentional
use of implicit, or "wink and nod," agreements with undercover informants to
circumvent the right to counsel. Although the court's decision may further the
interests of effective law enforcement, the resulting sacrifice of fair play in the
adversarial justice system is too costly for society to bear.
Daniel Kirsch, The Prosecutor Circumvents the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel with
a Simple "Wink and Nod", 69 Mo. L. REv. 553,553 (2004).
149. Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 1992).
150. /d. at 1270.
151. /d.
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specific instructions to procure incriminating information, the court
determined that Oglesby knew that he had to procure such confes
sions while in jail in order to get a good recommendation at his
sentencing. 152 Determining that this arrangement created a princi
pal-agent relationship, the court stated:
[i]t is not significant that Oglesby was not planted for the purpose
of gaining information from a targeted defendant. The fact that
the Commonwealth intentionally left him there to harvest infor
mation from anyone charged with a crime and awaiting trial is
the villainy. The vast majority of people in county jail are
charged with crimes and awaiting trial and they have a right to
counsel when interrogated about the crimes with which they are
charged. 153

The Moose decision represents an important position in favor
of closing a major loophole left open by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court's failure to provide clear guiding principles on
the determination of state agency has created tensions among vari
ous courts throughout the United States applying the Sixth
Amendment.
To date, the Supreme Court of Canada has not addressed the
issue of whether the state must specifically identify the accused. 154
Yet the absence of a targeting requirement has not created anything
that resembles the disparate approaches in United States courts. To
recall, the Supreme Court of Canada's legal test for determining
state agency under s. 7 focuses on the material impact of the state's
intervention on the exchange between the accused and the inform
ant.1 55 This analysis leaves open the question whether the state's
intervention can "materially impact" an exchange if the state agent
is not even made aware that the state wants to obtain information
from a sI?ecific accused.
Furthermore, the facts of Hebert, Broyles, and Liew seem to
imply that a specific targeting requirement is called for to deter
152. [d.
153. [d.
154. It is notable that in a pre-Broyles decision, R. v. Gray, the Ontario Court of
Appeal held that an informant who worked for the police on other matters was not a
state agent when he elicited incriminating statements without explicit instructions. See
R. v. Gray, 4 O.R.3d 33, 'lI'l1 33-35 (Ont. c.A. 1991) (Can.), available at 1991 Carswell
Ont 691 (Westlaw). However Broyles, which was decided after Gray, provided more
expansive coverage of what constitutes a "police agent." See Tanovich, supra note 54,
at 27-28 (discussing the Gray decision and the Broyles factors).
155. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
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mine state agency.156 In Hebert and Liew, the state agents were
both undercover police officers and there was no question of their
status as agents of the state, nor was there any question that the
officers were seeking to acquire information from the identified de
fendants.157 Undercover police officers are not likely to be sent
into the jailhouse environment as agents-at-Iarge, but are sent in to
acquire information about specific individuals. In Broyles, the state
agent, Ritter, who was the accused's friend, was explicitly requested
by the authorities to provide them with any incriminating state
ments made by Broyles. 15s
However, there is also language in Broyles which suggests that
a specific targeting requirement may not be required. The Broyles
Court noted, there may be circumstances where the state makes it
known to a jailhouse informant that it will reward the informant for
acquiring incriminating information about others within the jail
house context and that such actions may constitute a material inter
vention. 159 The test in such circumstances is "would the exchange
between the informer and the accused have taken place but for the
inducements of the authorities?"160 It is feasible in such contexts
that law enforcement officials may suggest to a potential informant
that they are interested in receiving information generally about
others but not specify a particular accused. In such circumstances,
it would be consistent with a purposive approach to s. 7 to protect
the interests of vulnerable defendants, despite the absence of any
specific targeting by the state.
A requirement that state agents be instructed to obtain incrim
inating statements from a specific accused, however, may, for the
most part, be a moot issue in Canadian Charter jurisprudence.
Among the many cell-plant interrogation cases, at least since the
time Hebert was decided, a large number have involved the use of
undercover police officers as state agents. 161 The specific targeting
156. R. v. Liew, [1999] 3 s.c.R. 227 (Can. 1999), available at 1999 CarswellAlta
821 (Westlaw); R v. Broyles, [1991]3 S.c.R. 595 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 Carswel
lAlta 212 (Westlaw); R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151 (Can. 1990), available at 1990
CarswellYukon 7 (Westlaw).
157. Liew, [1999] 2 S.c.R. 227, <J[ 7; Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151, <J[ 53.
158. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, <J[ 41.
159. Id. n 30-32.
160. Id. <J[ 32.
161. See, e.g., Liew, [1999] 3 S.c.R. 227; R. v. Brown, [1993] 2 S.c.R. 918 (Can.
1993), available at 1993 CarswellAlta 412 (Westlaw); Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151; R. v.
Spanevello, 51 B.C.L.R.3d 192 (B.C.C.A. 1998) (Can.), available at 1998 CarswellBC
1129 (Westlaw); R. v. Bell, 92 B.C.A.C. 275 (B.C.C.A. 1997) (Can.), available at 1997
CarswellBC 1384 (Westlaw); R. v. Kiloh, 2003 B.C.S.c. 209 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2003) (Can.),
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requirement is germane to the context of jailhouse informants who
elicit information. However, it does not arise when the state agents
are police officers. Where undercover police officers have conver
sations with suspects in custody, the Broyles Court expressly stated,
"it is clear that the conversation" between the accused and the un
dercover police officer "would not have taken place but for the in
tervention of the officer."162
Given the onerous challenges that an accused must face in or
der to demonstrate "active elicitation" under Broyles, it appears
that Canadian law enforcement agencies have been willing, in many
instances, to forego any potential challenges to state agency by their
frequent use of undercover police officers. Conversely, given the
more flexible nature of the deliberate elicitation standard in the
United States, law enforcement officers have taken advantage of
the unclear parameters set by the United States Supreme Court in
determining state agency. In several United States jurisdictions, of
ficers have effectively managed to circumvent an accused's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by employing jailhouse informants.163
IV.

ELICITATION

The second key element that an American or Canadian defen
dant must prove in order to show that the state violated her consti
tutional rights through a cell-plant interrogation is that its agent
elicited the incriminating statements. In the United States, the elici
tation must be "deliberate," indicating intentional conduct.164
Under Canadian law, the state agent must "actively" elicit the inavailable at 2003 CarswellBC 326 (Westlaw); R. v. Ertmoed, 2002 B.C.S.C. 806 (B.C.
Sup. Ct. 2002) (Can.), available at 2002 CarswellBC 3701 (Westlaw); R. v. Pritchard,
2002 B.C.S.C. 453 (B.c. Sup. Ct. 2002) (Can.), available at 2002 CarswellBC 3532
(Westlaw); R. v. Van Osselaer, 2000 B.C.S.C. 1065 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2000) (Can.), available
at 2000 CarswellBC 2648 (Westlaw); R. v. Skinner, 84 Man. R.2d 223 (Man. Q. B. 1992)
(Can.), available at 1992 CarswellMan 157 (Westlaw); R. v. Jackson, 51 0.A.c. 92 (Ont.
c.A. 1991) (Can.), available at 1991 CarswellOnt 119 (Westlaw); R. v. Graham, 1
0.R.3d 499 (Ont. c.A. 1991) (Can.), available at 1991 CarswellOnt 77 (Westlaw); R. v.
Jenkins, Chatham 2049/00, 2000 WL 31978665 (Ont. S.c.J. 2002) (Can.), available at
2002 CatswellOnt 6175 (Westlaw); R. v. Moulton, [1999] O.J. No. 661 (Ont. C.J. Gen.
Div. 1999) (Can.), available at 1999 CarswellOnt 593 (Westlaw); R. c. Caron, Laval 540
01-16962-022 (Que. Sup. Ct. 2004) (Can.), available at 2004 Carswell Que 7529
(Westlaw).
162. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, 'II 31.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 918, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2003); see
also supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
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criminating statements, implying both intentionality and perhaps
substantial or vigorous conduct. 165 As this section will demon
strate, the United States juridical approach to deliberate elicitation
is more flexible than its approach to state agency, allowing for less
active forms of eliciting conduct. 166 Conversely, while the Supreme
Court of Canada articulated more generous factors to determining
state agency, it has placed more significant hurdles in the way of the
accused to prove that the incriminating statement was actively elic
ited. 167 In determining "active" elicitation, Canadian courts look
specifically to both the nature of the exchange and the nature of the
relationship between the accused and the state agent. 168
A.

Nature of the Exchange
1.

Language of the Legal Tests

The United States Supreme Court has held that a "defendant
must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some
action, beyond merely listening, that was deSIgned deliberately to
elicit incriminating remarks. "169 While the test recognizes an ac
tive/passive distinction and requires the state agent to cross the con
stitutional threshold· by engaging in some action, it does not require
that the conduct rise to the level of a formal interrogation or its
functional equivalent. 170 Furthermore, the test not only looks at
the conduct of the state agent, but also the conduct of the police (in
perhaps arranging for the elicitation to take place).l71 This would
seem to require courts to examine the totality of the state's conduct.
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada assesses the nature
of the exchange between the accused and the state agent with refer
ence to the following factors from Broyles: "[d]id the state agent
actively seek out information such that the exchange could be char
acterized as akin to an interrogation, or did he or she conduct his or
her part of the conversation as someone in the role the accused
believed the informer to be playing would ordinarily have
165. See, e.g., Broyles, [1991]3 s.c.R. 595, 'II 35.
166. See infra Part IV.A.2.
167. See infra Part IV.A.3.
168. See, e.g., Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595.
169. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 458 (1986).
170. See Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524-25 (2004). The distinction
between deliberate elicitation and interrogation, however, has not always been clear.
See James J. Tomkovicz, Reaffirming the Right to Pretrial Assistance: The Surprising
Little Case o/Fellers v. United States, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 501, 509-30 (2006).
171. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 458 (holding that the defendant must show that
"the police ... took some action").

UPROOTING THE CELL PLANT

2009]

73

done?"l72 The language of this test dearly stresses greater activity
on the part of the state agent that calls, in effect, for the accused to
demonstrate that the agent took significant action to procure the
impugned statements. Also, these Broyles factors myopically focus
on the conduct of the state agent, but do not look at the overall
actions of both the state and its agent.
2.

United States Jurisprudence

Although the concept of deliberate elicitation has been applied
in the Sixth Amendment context since the United States Supreme
Court's 1964 decision in Massiah, the Court defined deliberate elici
tation for the first time in Kuhlmann v. Wilson in 1986. 173 In Mas
siah, the Court described the exchange between Massiah and
Colson, the state's agent, as a "conversation" but never mentioned
what specific statements Colson may have made to elicit the incul
patory statements from Massiah. 174 The Henry Court similarly did
not define elicitation. 175 Factually, there was no indication as to
what the informant actually said to elicit Henry's incriminating re
marks or who initiated the conversations that led to the statements
being made. 176 Fundamentally, Henry focused on whether the state
"intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce Henry to make
incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel."l77 Fur
thermore, the Court observed that "confinement may bring into
play subtle influences that will make him particularly susceptible to
the ploys of undercover Government agents."178 Thus, "the incrim
inating conversations between Henry and Nichols were facilitated
172. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, 'lI 38.
173. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 458.
174. Colson was actually arrested with Massiah for the trafficking of narcotics.
Prior to their conversation, which took place in Colson'S car, Colson brokered a deal
with the state where he would plead guilty and assist in acquiring incriminating state
ments from Massiah. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03.
175. See generally United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
176. Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, wrote:
We know nothing about the nature of these conversations, particularly
whether Nichols subtly or otherwise focused attention on the bank robberies.
Indeed, to the extent the record says anything at all, it supports the inference
that it was Henry, not Nichols, who "engaged" the other "in some conversa
tions," and who was the moving force behind any mention of the crime.
Id. at 288 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also White, Interrogation Without Questions,
supra note 41, at 1219.
177. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
178. Id.

74

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:39

by Nichols' conduct and apparent status as a person sharing a com
mon plight. "179
As with state agency, United States courts were left to deter
mine the meaning of deliberate elicitation from the facts of Henry
and other Sixth Amendment cases. 180 Yet, despite the lack of a pre
cise definition, Henry's factual context made clear that the Court
was more interested in the mere fact that the state agent engaged in
conversation that resulted in the utterance of incriminating state
ments than whether the agent actively pursued the elicitation.
Thus, it was unnecessary to examine the content of the state agent's
statements.
In Kuhlmann, the Supreme Court articulated its deliberate
elicitation test: a "defendant must demonstrate that the police and
their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was
designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. "181 The
phrasing of this test naturally leaves open what and how much ac
tion is actually required beyond mere listening; this is to be under
stood within the factual circumstances of each case. In Kuhlmann,
the accused, Wilson, was arraigned for robbery and murder, which
took place at a taxi depot where he worked.1 82 Wilson was con
fined in a jail cell with an informant named Lee, who had a prior
arrangement with the state to report any statements made by Wil
son, particularly the names of Wilson's accomplices to the crimes. 183
Adding to Wilson's anxieties, and ultimately helping prompt him to
speak, was his placement in a jail cell that overlooked the actual
179. Id.
180. The Court dealt with the issue of "deliberate elicitation" in a Sixth Amend
ment case decided a few years prior to Henry, though not in a case involving an under
cover police agent. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). In Brewer, two police
officers transported an individual suspected of murdering a ten-year-old girl from one
city to another. Id. at 393. One of the police officers accompanying the suspect (and
after the latter's Sixth Amendment rights attached) appealed to the suspect's Christian
sensibilities to reveal the location of the girl's body. /d. Without asking the suspect any
questions, the police officer created a vivid image of the body of the girl he was sus
pected of killing being buried by a snowstorm and her parents holding a burial with no
body. ld. The Court determined that the officer's monologue violated the suspect's
right to counsel and analogized the officer's deliberate elicitation to an interrogation.
ld. at 399. It held that the police officer "deliberately and designedly set out to elicit
information from Williams just as surely as-and perhaps more effectively than-if he
had formally interrogated him." Id. An understanding of the definition emerges from
the facts of the case, but like Henry, decided a few years later, no factors were articu
lated. For an insightful discussion on the Brewer decision, see Kamisar, supra note 72.
181. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986).
182. Id. at 439.
183. ld.
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crime scene. 184 Wilson began to speak "to Lee about the robbery,
narrating the same story that he had given the police at the time of
his arrest."185 Lee advised Wilson that the latter's story "didn't
sound too good."186 In a footnote, the Court related a different
account of this conversation, observing that during the trial, Lee
had said more to Wilson than the Court suggested in the main text
of its decision. 187 The footnote stated: "[a]t the suppression hear
ing, Lee testified that, after hearing respondent's initial version of
his participation in the crimes, 'I think I remember telling him that
the story wasn't-it didn't sound too good. Things didn't look too
good for him.' "188 When Lee testified at trial, he recalled yet an
other variation of his original remark, stating, "Well, I said, look,
you better come up with a better story than that because that one
doesn't sound too cool to me, that's what I said."189 This narration
demonstrates that Lee's statements seemed to be somewhat more
extensive than what the Court recounted, and thus it is curious why
it limited Lee's testimony to the abbreviated "didn't sound too
goOd."190
In the days following this conversation, Wilson allegedly began
to change his story. However, the Court's record does not describe
the nature of conversations between Wilson and Lee during that
period. 191 Wilson received a visit from his brother informing him
that family members were upset because they believed Wilson mur
dered the taxi dispatcher. 192 Emotionally impacted by this meeting,
Wilson supposedly revealed his crime to Lee, who surreptitiously
took notes and conveyed them to the authorities. 193 Wilson's in
criminating statements were then admitted into evidence, and he
was convicted. 194
184. It is not clear whether the police placed Wilson in that cell intentionally to
increase his anxiety or whether it was merely coincidental. However, given that the
police placed an agent in the cell to obtain incriminating statements, it seems unlikely
that the placement was unintentional. Interestingly, the Court found this fact insignifi
cant and ignored it as mere coincidence. [d. at 460 n.24.
185. [d. at 439.
186. [d. at 439-40 (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Peter
Brooks, Narrative Transactions-Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18 J.L. & HUMAN.
1 (2006).
187. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 440 n.1.
188. [d.
189. [d.
190. [d.
191. [d. at 440.
192. [d.
193. [d.
194. [d. at 441.
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The Supreme Court held that Wilson's right to counsel was not
violated under the circumstances of the case, asserting that his com
ments were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited," notwithstanding
Lee's remark that the story "didn't sound too good."195 The Court
simply refused to consider the other versions of Lee's account for
the purposes of the deliberate elicitation test. Its articulation of de
liberate elicitation being "some action, beyond merely listening,
that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks" was
tainted by the Court's misapplication of the test to the facts of
Kuhlrnann. 196 Clearly Lee, by his own testimony, took action be
yond mere listening that was designed to elicit incriminating state
ments, notwithstanding the instructions he was given just to
listen. 197 His actions were likely to induce the utterance of an in
criminating response. The Court should have properly character
ized Lee's response as sufficient for a violation of the elicitation
test, and its decision evidences that the active/passive distinction
could lead to problematic results. 198 Moreover, the Court's narra
tion of the facts was faulty not solely for its willful blindness to
Lee's testimonial acknowledgment of what he said to Wilson. It
was compounded by its failure to consider the likelihood that over
the course of a few days of shared confinement, this would not be
the only thing that Lee said to induce Wilson to reveal incriminat
ing information about his crime. 199 As Justice Brennan astutely ob
served in his dissenting opinion, a Sixth Amendment analysis
195. Id. at 460.
196. See id. at 459.
197. Recall that in Henry, Nichols was also instructed just to listen, but failed to
follow the instructions. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271 (1980) ("The
Government argues that the federal agents instructed Nichols not to question Henry
about the robbery."). The Court also held that the state controls the agent and cannot
benefit from the agent's disobedience. Id. at 271-74.
198. The Court's emphasis on the active/passive character of the elicitation cre
ates certain analytical problems. In order to determine whether a state agent actively
elicited incriminating statements or was a passive listener, courts, absent any recordings,
must rely upon the self-serving testimony of the informant and the accused. See April
Leigh Ammeter, Kuhlmann v. Wilson: "Passive" and "Active" Government Infor
mants-A Problematic Test, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1423, 1435-36 (1987); Matthew J. Merritt,
Jailhouse Informants and the Sixth Amendment: Is the U.S. Supreme Court Adequately
Protecting An Accused's Right to Counsel?, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1348-49 (2003).
199. Justice Brennan also notes in his dissent: "Lee encouraged [Wilson] to talk
about his crime by conversing with him on the subject over the course of several days
and by telling [Wilson] that his exculpatory story would not convince anyone without
more work." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 475 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is unclear whether
this was something that Justice Brennan inferred or was based upon some fact stated in
the parties' submissions.
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required a more complete review of "the entire course of govern
ment" conduct. 2°O
However, a recent Sixth Amendment case may be signaling a
shift towards a broader understanding of deliberate elicitation. In
Fellers v. United States, two non-undercover police officers went to
the accused's home to arrest him.201 Fellers invited the two officers
into his house. 202 After the officers entered, they advised him that
they had a federal warrant for his arrest following a grand jury's
indictment for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamines. 203 The
officers advised Fellers that the indictment named four other indi
viduals. 204 Unprompted by the officers, Fellers admitted to know
ing the four individuals and to using methamphetamines during his
association with them. 20s
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the officers deliber
ately elicited Fellers's remarks in violation of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, given that he was indicted at the time of the en
counter. 206 By informing the accused of the charges and the names
of the others indicted, the officers conduct went beyond mere lis
tening, thus deliberately eliciting the incriminating statements. Yet,
in light of the outcome in Kuhlmann, the conduct of the Fellers po
lice officers does not appear to rise to the level of sufficiently active
conduct. The Fellers case, through its facts, has perhaps restored a
broader interpretation of "deliberate elicitation," one that requires
less action to satisfy the deliberate elicitation test.
3.

Canadian Jurisprudence

Juxtaposed against these United States Supreme Court inter
pretations of elicitation are those advanced by the Supreme Court
of Canada. The latter's first application of the s. 7 right to silence to
cell-plant interrogation was in R. v. Hebert. 207 In Hebert, the ac
cused was arrested for robbery.208 After being advised of his right
to counsel and consulting with a lawyer, Hebert refused to make a
200.

[d. at 476.

201.

Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 521 (2004).

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 524-25.

207. R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 Carswell
Yukon 7 (Westlaw).
208. [d. 'lI 13.
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statement and was placed in a jail cell.209 The authorities placed an
undercover police officer in the cell with Hebert, who successfully
elicited incriminating statements from him.210 The Court arrived at
the conclusion that Hebert's right to silence was violated without
reviewing a specific transcript of the exchange. 211 This may indicate
that the Court purposely sought to produce a broad interpretation
of elicitation.
In R. v. Broyles, decided the following year, the Court held
that the exchange between the accused and the state's agent (the
accused's friend), Ritter, was the functional equivalent of an inter
rogation and that Ritter directed the conversation to areas where
the state wanted information and did not allow the conversation to
"flow naturally."212 During the course of their exchanges, Ritter
made statements disparaging Broyles's counsel, which the Court as
serted undermined Broyles's right to counsel,213
Broyles contributed to the case law on cell-plant interrogations
by providing a more developed factual context by way of transcripts
of the Broyles-Ritter conversation. 214 Subsequent courts could
look to the transcribed dialogue in Broyles and gauge the degree of
"active" elicitation required to find a violation of s. 7 in cases
before them. However, while providing a factual context, Broyles
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. A review of some of the immediate post-Hebert cases suggests that some
lower courts were not prepared to view the absence of a transcript as an invitation to
perceive elicitation in a more flexible manner. See, e.g., R. v. Gray, (1991) 4 O.R. (3d)
33, available at 1991 CarswellOnt 691 (Westlaw); R. v. Graham, (1991) 1 O.R. (3d) 499,
available at 1991 CarswellOnt 77 (Westlaw).
212. R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, 'lI 42 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 Car
swellAlta 212 (Westlaw). The following excerpt of a conversation that occurred be
tween the accused and the informant demonstrates the court's findings:
BROYLES: Like I, I already said stuff and whatnot. There's really no more that
I can say.
RIITER: You could admit to them that you killed her.
BROYLES: But I didn't.
RIITER: Are you sure?
BROYLES: Yeah.
RIITER: You weren't out on drugs or nothing.
BROYLES: No.
RIITER: That you don't remember. That you would have lost control.
BROYLES: No.
Id.

213.' Id. n 43-44 ("The right to counsel would indeed be meaningless if the au
thorities were entitled to undermine the confidence of the accused in his counsel in
order to extract a confession.").
214. Id. <JI 42.
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also set an onerous standard for an accused to prove active elicita
tion by suggesting that an agent must issue a series of probing ques
tions-akin to an interrogation or its functional equivalent-in
order for the nature-of-the-exchange factors to be met.2 15 The fol
lowing two cases illustrate that a state agent's questioning need not
be as "active" as Ritter's questioning in Broyles, yet could be just as
effective given an accused's ignorance of the fact that he is speaking
to an undercover state agent and the coercive impact of the deten
tion environment where the questioning takes place.
Some years after his first brush with cell-plant interrogations,
which brought his case to the Supreme Court of Canada, Broyles
was once again arrested, this time for the murder of his common
law spouse. 216 While in detention pending trial, a jailhouse inform
ant who had no previous relationship with Broyles developed a
friendship with him over the course of thirteen days.217 During that
period, the informant gave Broyles cigarettes and protected him
when he was attacked by other inmates. 218 Following an emotional
visit by his mother and his pastor, Broyles sought out his new jail
house friend to vent his angst. 219 Seeing Broyles upset, the inform
ant grabbed two juice bottles and both he and Broyles went into a
corner to talk.220 The informant then asked, "What's the mat
ter?"221 Broyles replied that "he wished that he never did what he
did again."222 The informant asked, "What do you[] mean?"
Broyles then replied, "I wish I never had strangled her, but the
bitch was always fighting and nagging on me."223 Broyles's com
215. The anxieties inherent to detention can make it so that such probing ques
tions are unnecessary to elicit incriminating responses. See discussion supra notes 17-20
and accompanying text.
216. R. v. Broyles (Broyles 1/), 312 AR. 31, n 3-4 (Alta C.A. 1999) (Can.), avail
able at 1999 CarswellAlta 341 (Westlaw). Broyles II, as used here, is not subsequent
history to Broyles, but is referred to as such to distinguish the two cases.
217. The informant was instructed to be a "potted plant," meaning that "he was
not to interrogate the appellant." [d. <j[ 7.
218. [d.
219. [d.!j[ 16.
220.
221.
222.
223.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. This was essentially the account of the exchange as told to the detective,
who then provided this account as a witness. See id. This account, however, is different

from the version that the informant relayed when he testified. The court stated that the
informant claimed that after Broyles's mother visited, Broyles "felt really bad that he
had let his mom down, that this had all happened, again. And it was at this point that
he brought to my attention that he said he had strangled an individual." [d. The two
accounts, while similar substantively, are markedly different when examining the over
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ments were admitted into evidence by the trial court justice, and the
Alberta Court of Appeal ultimately affirmed the trial court's deci
sion that the responses were not elicited through the functional
equivalent of an interrogation. 224
While it is clear that the informant merely asked Broyles what
the latter meant when he said that "he wished that he never did
what he did again," his question was clearly calculated and likely to
elicit an incriminating response, particularly since it was coming
from a trusted friend and jailhouse protector. 225 Viewing the facts
in context, the informant did not have to engage in a long series of
questions to elicit information, for Broyles was already in a rather
vulnerable state. 226 Interrogations do not require lengthy interrog
ative statements; even short and concise ones may lead to the re
sponses that the interrogator is seeking to obtain. Furthermore,
imagine in a similar scenario if a non-undercover police officer were
to ask "what do you mean" to an individual like Broyles, who, in a
guilt ridden state, had just uttered that he regretted what he had
done. If the accused has not been informed either of his right to
counselor silence, the courts should certainly construe the question
as eliciting an incriminating statement. Just as non-undercover po
lice officers do not have to engage in lengthy banter to elicit incrim
inating statements, neither should undercover police officers.
In 1999, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in R. v.
Liew, which placed more significant hurdles in the way of an ac
cused who is seeking to demonstrate a s. 7 violation. 227 The case
involved an undercover police officer, Jones, who elicited incrimi
nating statements from the accused while they were in custody at
all context and, moreover, the role of the informant in this dialogue who asked the
accused questions to elicit the incriminating response. Id. Reading the informer's testi
mony, one could certainly surmise that Broyles provided all the incriminating informa
tion in an unsolicited manner. Absent as well from the informer's account is the fact
that he took two drinks and went into the corner to talk about what was upsetting
Broyles. Id. In so doing, the informer set up a private moment between friends that
induced Broyles to admit his sorrow and guilt. Id. The informant's account also reveals
the problems of relying on the testimony of an informant in the absence of a recording
device.
224. Id. 'll 17. The trial court found that the informant was not a state agent and
thus did not engage in an analysis of the elicitation question. Id. 'll 13. The Court of
Appeal determined that while the informant was a state agent, the statements procured
were not the product of an active elicitation. See id. 'll'll 17-18.
225. See id. 'll 16.
226. See id.
227. R. v. Liew, [1999] 3 S.c.R. 227 (Can. 1999), available at 1999 CarswellAlta
821 (Westlaw).
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the police station after their arrests during an undercover drug sting
operation. 228 Following the arrests, Jones continued to play his un
dercover role and was transported in the same squad car with
Liew. 229 At the police station, Jones and Liew were placed in a
room together where Liew initiated general conversation with
Jones about the crime for which they were both arrested. 230 Jones
then shifted the conversation to a specific area of inquiry where
upon Liew made incriminating statements. 231 These were admitted
into evidence, and Liew was convicted.232
The Supreme Court held that Jones did not actively elicit
Liew's incriminating statements. 233 Focusing on the nature of the
exchange, the Court asserted that when Jones asked "[w]hat hap
pened?" and further stated "[t]hey got my fingerprints on the
dope," he was merely following the "natural flow of the conversa
228. [d. 'lI'Il 8-16.
229. [d. 'lI'Il 10-11.
230. [d. 'lI'l1 12-16.
231. [d. 'lI 14.
232. [d. 'lI'l1 17, 24. Their conversation is reproduced below with the italicized
portions representing the contested portions that Liew sought to have excluded:
ApPELLANT: That Lee is hot.
JONES: What?
ApPELLANT: That Lee is hot.
JONES: Fuck.
ApPELLANT: Did you pass the money?
JONES: Fuck. The copS got it.
ApPELLANT: How much?
JONES: $48,000.00
ApPELLANT: Ah, fuck.
JONES: What happened?
ApPELLANT: The cops watching us.
JONES: Yeah. They got my fingerprints on the dope.
ApPELLANT: Lee and me too.
JONES: Why the fuck didn't you give it to me out of the black car? Why did
you drive away?
ApPELLANT: That the other guy. That not my dope. I just give it to Lee and
drop him off. We very careful.
JONES: The cops must have been following you guys.
ApPELLANT: No we were very careful but Lee very hot.
The appellant then asked about the $48,000 and the conversation continued:
JONES: Fuck man, they're going to kill me for this man.
ApPELLANT: Where are you from?
JONES: From Slave Lake.
ApPELLANT: Whose money?
JONES: Indians from up there. Fuck man, my prints, Lee's prints and your
prints are on the shit.
ApPELLANT: Yeah.
[d. 'lI'Il 14-15 (emphasis added).
233. [d. 'lI'lI 47-51.
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tion" initiated by the accused. 234 Chief Justice Lamer, sitting as the
sole dissenter, argued that Jones redirected the conversation from
one about money, albeit initiated by the accused, to the issue of
possession of narcotics, which resulted in his making the incriminat
ing statement. 235 Thus, according to the Chief Justice, Jones did not
merely follow the "natural flow" of the conversation. 236 Although
Jones did not phrase his statement about the fingerprints as an in
terrogative statement, it was nevertheless a comment intended to
elicit an incriminating response. 237
The nature of the exchange factors first discussed in Broyles ,238
and applied in Broyles II239 and Liew,240 demonstrate that an ac
cused must show a significant degree of "active" conduct in order
for courts to find that the agent elicited incriminating statements
from the defendant. Unfortunately, unlike the United States Su
preme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada has neglected to take
into account the impact of the detention environment on an ac
cused and how state agents may unfairly exploit such considerations
to their advantage. 241 Gordon Wall has argued that "[w]here a sus
pect is confined in prison, a [more] contextualized approach [to
elicitation] would take account of the impact of confinement by the
state."242 Given the nature of the detention environment, the de
gree of elicitation required to procure incriminating statements
from incarcerated suspects pending trial should not need to rise to
the level of a formal interrogation or its functional equivalent.
The Supreme Court of Canada's understanding of cell-plant in
terrogations and their functional equivalent needs to be revisited.

n
n

Id.
48-49.
[d.
3-5 (Lamer, c.J., dissenting).
[d. 'll 5.
[d.
238. R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595,
37-39 (Can. 1991), available at 1991
CarswellAlta 212 (Westlaw).
239. See R. v. Broyles (Broyles II), 312 A.R. 31,
14-18 (Alta C.A. 1999)
(Can.), available at 1999 CarswellAlta 341 (WestIaw).
240. See Liew, (1999] 3 S.C.R. 227,
47-55.
241. See R v. Hebert, [1990]2 S.c.R. 151, 'll'll12, 27 (Can. 1990), available at 1990
CarswellYukon 7 (WestIaw) (Sopinka, J., concurring).
242. Gordon Wall, The Pre-Trial Right to Silence in Canada and the United King
dom 49 (Sept. 1995) (unpublished LLM thesis, Queen's University) (on file with the
Western New England Law Review). Wall offered the following test for courts to con
sider as part of the Broyles nature of the exchange of factors: "Considering all the
circumstances of the exchange between the accused and the state agent, is there a
causal link between the conduct of the state and/or its agents (including confining the
accused in prison) and the making of the statement by the accused?" Id. at 50; see also
Tanovich, supra note 54, at 31.
234.
235.
236.
237.

n

n

n
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Although the Liew Court held that an "atmosphere of oppression"
need not be present during a cell-plant interrogation in order for s.
7 to be violated,243 the Broyles Court's reliance on the transcript of
Ritter's interrogation of Broyles suggests that an interrogation
should constitute a series of persistently asked questions (as in
Broyles) that may fall short of "oppression."244 In a normal inter
rogation environment, an accused is aware that she is speaking with
police officers, and she may exert a significant degree of resistance
that a police officer conducting the interrogation will have to
overcome.
In contrast, in a cell-plant interrogation, the accused's igno
rance of the fact that she is speaking with a state agent will likely
induce her to drop her guard, thus making it unnecessary to pursue
the type of active interrogation questioning to which Ritter sub
jected Broyles. 245 According to a significant police interrogation
manual, a "principal psychological factor contributing to a success
ful interrogation is privacy" and the absence of any "usual police
surroundings" that will remind the accused that she is in an interro
gation room.246 Furthermore, law enforcement officers are advised
to give the impression that they are merely seeking the truth; they
are not investigators seeking a conviction. 247 A cell-plant interroga
tion includes all of these elements, which is why law enforcement
agents favor their use. When the object of the exchange is to elicit
incriminating statements, regardless of the form, the substance re
mains the same-interrogation.
B.

Nature of the Relationship

All actions taken in life are understood within a particular fac
tual (and cultural) context and it is this context that helps to shape
and give actions their meaning. The relationship between an ac
cused and the state agent can have an impact on the manner in
which statements are elicited. For example, subtle remarks may
elicit an incriminating statement between two close friends al
though similar remarks may not evoke the same response in an
other context. In some traditional custodian interrogations, police
243.
244.
245.
246.
SIONS 1, 7
247.

See Liew, [1999] 3 S.C.R 227, 'Il 37.
See Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, 'Il 42.
[d.
FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL
(1962).
[d. at 13.

INTERROGATION AND CONFES

84

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:39

officers will attempt to befriend an accused. 248 If the police officer
is significantly older than the accused, the officer may foster a ma
ternal or paternal relationship to elicit an incriminating response. 249
Therefore, just as environmental factors such as the detention con
text need to be considered, so too should the relationship of the
agent and the accused have some bearing on interpreting the im
pact of the conduct that results in the utterance of the incriminating
responses.
While the United States Supreme Court in Henry considered
how confinement may impact the elicitation of incriminating state
ments in the detention context (although it seemed to have ignored
it altogether in Kuhlmann), it has not mandated an analysis of the
nature of the relationship between the state agent and the accused
or how that relationship may have impacted the elicitation. 250 In
Kulhmann, the informant, Lee, spent a few days in the cell with the
accused, Wilson, and although a relationship of trust may have de
veloped, it was of no moment to the Court when it held that Lee
did not elicit Wilson's incriminating statements. However, in his
dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan observed, "[t]he informant,
while avoiding direct questions, nonetheless developed a relation
ship of cellmate camaraderie with respondent and encouraged him
to talk about his crime."251 Yet the Court chose to ignore this rela
tionship in its analysis, including how that relationship may have
248. See White, Police Trickery, supra note 26, at 615 n.243.
249. See State v. Woods, 345 N.W.2d 457, 472 (Wis. 1984); see also White, Police
Trickery, supra note 26, at 615.
250. In two decisions prior to Kuhlmann, however, there are hints that suggest
that the relationship between the state agent and the accused may have been of some
consideration to the Court. For instance, when the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Henry, it specifically noted the lower court's observation that
whether "by association, by general conversation, or both, [the informant] had devel
oped a relationship of trust and confidence with Henry such that Henry revealed in
criminating information." United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269 (1980). Such
interference amounted to a violation of Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id.
However, it did not further address the issue in its own opinion. Subsequently, in
Maine v. Moulton, a case where the state's informant, Colson, was the co-defendant in a
criminal prosecution involving the accused, the Court held that Colson elicited incrimi
nating statements from Moulton. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985). In a foot
note, the Court observed that Colson and Moulton's relationship as co-defendants
could impact upon the elicitation. It stated: "Because Moulton thought of Colson only
as his co-defendant, Colson'S engaging Moulton in active conversation about their up
coming trial was certain to elicit statements that Moulton would not intentionally re
veal-and had a constitutional right not to reveal-to persons known to be police
agents." Id. at 176 n.13.
251. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 476 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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impacted the actions Lee took to elicit the incriminating statements
from Wilson.
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly examines
the "nature of the relationship" between the accused and the state
agent to identify whether the agent has exploited a relationship of
trust between the twO. 252 As articulated in Broyles, a court must
ask:
Did the state agent exploit any special characteristics of the rela
tionship to extract the statement? Was there a relationship of
trust between the state agent and the accused? Was the accused
obligated or vulnerable to the state agent? Did the state agent
manipulate the accused to bring about a mental state in which
the accused was more likely to talk?253

These factors, emphasizing a relationship of trust between the
defendant and the state agent, fail to specifically address how such
relationships critically impact the actual exchange and may produce
incriminating information. These factors also suggest that an ac
cused must demonstrate that the state agent has used a pre-existing
or developed relationship of trust to extract incriminating state
ments. In Broyles, the Court determined that Ritter used his pre
existing relationship of trust with the accused to manipulate the lat
ter into eventually inculpating himself. 254
A relationship of trust can be a crucial (and perhaps disposi
tive) factor in determining the existence of a violation of s. 7. For
instance, in R. v. Jackson an undercover female police officer,
Slack, developed a relationship of trust with the accused, who was
incarcerated pending trial.2 55 Posing as a student interested in the
judicial system, Slack attended Jackson's preliminary enquiry and
was instructed to develop a relationship with the spouse of Jack
son's co-accused. 256 Jackson expressed interest in Slack, who was
later instructed by her superiors to visit Jackson in jail and maintain
her cover as a student. 257 Slack visited Jackson six times over the
course of six months, with each session lasting sixty to ninety min
utes in duration, supplemented with numerous exchanges of corre
252. See, e.g., R v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595 (Can. 1991), available at 1991
Carswell Alta 212 (Westlaw).
253. Id. 'lI 39.
254. Id. 'lI 43.
255. R. v. Jackson, 51 O.A.c. 92, 'lI 45 (Ont. c.A. 1991) (Can.), available at 1991
CarswellOnt 119 (Westlaw).
256. Id. 'lI 3l.
257. Id. 'lI 32.
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spondence during that period.258 When Jackson expressed a sexual
interest in Slack, she did nothing to dissuade him.259 Although
most of their conversations were unrelated to Jackson's alleged
crime, Slack was able eventually to elicit incriminating statements
from Jackson through their developed relationship of trust, which
was used to convict him.260 The Ontario Court of Appeal held that
Jackson's right to silence was infringed and the evidence should
have been excluded under s. 24(2).261 It determined that Slack nur
tured a relationship of trust with Jackson and noted the "strong sex
ual overtones" that imbued the relationship, particularly from
Jackson's perspective. 262 The court viewed this as "a strong invita
tion to Jackson to impart confidential matters to her in order to
buttress that relationship."263
Jackson does not mandate that the accused and the informant
interact for six months before a trust relationship can be developed.
R. v. Brown suggests that this relationship can be established within
a shorter, yet more concentrated time frame. 264 In Brown, an un
dercover police officer, Jones, was housed in the same cell with the
accused for at least a thirty-hour period. 265 Despite having no pre
existing relationship, Jones developed a relationship of trust by por
traying himself as an experienced criminal who had beaten "the
rap" himself. 266 Posing as a fellow criminal, Jones made Brown be
lieve that he had friends outside who could silence witnesses, hide
evidence, or take the fall on Brown's behalf for an appropriate
fee.2 67 Jones furthermore expressed an adversarial "us versus the
cops" relationship.268 Although the Alberta Court of Appeal held
that Brown's right to silence was not violated, the Supreme Court
reversed, basing its decision substantially on the dissenting opinion
258. !d. 'll'll 32, 34.
259. Id. 'll 33.
260. [d. 'll 34. Slack testified that during one of her conversations with Jackson,
he had admitted his involvement in the alleged murder, confiding that he and his co
accused had planned the murder together and had done it for money. Id. 'll 36. On a
subsequent visit, Jackson again told Slack that he had killed the victim and disclosed
that he had buried the clothes he had worn on the night of the murder at a location
found by the co-accused. Id.
261. Id. 'll'll 46, 63.
262. Id. 'll 44.
263. Id.
264. R. v. Brown, 127 A.R. 89, 'll 22 (Alta c.A. 1992) (Can.), rev'd, [1993] 2
S.c.R. 918 (Can. 1993), available at 1992 CarswellAita 667 (Westlaw).
265. Id.
266. Id. 'll 99.
267. Id.
268. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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provided by Justice Harradence of the Court of Appeal.269 Justice
Harradence determined that Jones was clearly a state agent who
developed a relationship of trust with Brown over the course of
their shared incarceration.27°
The undercover police officers in Jackson and Brown clearly
created relationships of trust that they then exploited to elicit in
criminating statements. They took extensive measures to gain the
confidence of the accused, even though these relationships did not
exist prior to arrest. The Supreme Court in R. v. Liew, however,
established a minimum floor defining a relationship of trust. 271 In
addition to a determination that the exchange with Liew did not
amount to the functional equivalent of an interrogation, the Court
also held that no relationship of trust existed between Jones and
Liew, notwithstanding their common participation in a drug opera
tion. 272 The Court asserted that Liew was "not a case where the
undercover officer cultivated a sustained relationship with the ac
cused over time, such that the accused may be said to have spoken
to the undercover officer in the reasonable expectation that his com
munications would not wind up in the hands of the police."273 The
Court posited further that "the facts indicate that the appellant and
the officer did not know each other prior to the arrests. In such
circumstances, it is difficult, if not impossible, to suggest that the
state agent exploited any special characteristics of his relationship
with the appellant to extract the statement."274 The Court con
cluded that "to speak of a 'relationship' at all seems to exaggerate
the circumstances. "275
Thus, where an undercover police officer has practically no
contact or prior relationship and has not cultivated a sustained rela
tionship with the accused over time once contact has been estab
lished, it seems unlikely that a court will ever find that a s. 7
violation has taken place. This naturally places an accused in an
extremely vulnerable position because of the potential for contact
with an undercover police officer in a cell plant. Furthermore, if
the undercover police officer is able to procure incriminating state
269. R. v. Brown, [1993] 2 S.c.R. 918, n 1, 3 (Can. 1993), available at 1993
CarswellAlta 412 (Westlaw).
270. Brown, 127 A.R. 89, <j[ 83 (Harradence, J., dissenting).
271. R. v. Liew, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 227, <j[ 52 (Can. 1999), available at 1999 Carswell
Alta 821 (Westlaw).
272. [d. <j[ 55.
273. [d. <j[ 54 (emphasis added).
274. [d. <j[ 55.
275. [d.
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ments in a short span of time, as did Corporal Jones in Liew, the
incriminating statements will almost always be admitted. If the
short relationship between the undercover state agent and the ac
cused is one where the latter cannot have a reasonable expectation
that his comments would be communicated to the police, then it
seems that even if the agent's conduct amounted to the functional
equivalent of an interrogation, the statements may still be admitted.
The "reasonable expectation" accretion to the s. 7 jurispru
dence does not add any value to the right to silence. 276 Absent a
privileged relationship, such as a lawyer-client or marital relation
ship, what reasonable legal expectation does any individual have
that his incriminating statements to a third party will not be re
vealed to the police and used against him, whether they are made in
detention or outside? The key to a violation of the right to silence
is that an accused's right to choose to speak with the state is under
mined by the actions of the state agent, and not whether the ac
cused had a reasonable expectation that these statements would not
be revealed to the police.
The existence of a relationship of trust and whether a state
agent has manipulated that relationship can certainly have an im
pact upon whether an elicitation has taken place, but its absence
should not diminish an accused's constitutional right to silence. De
tention itself provides a coercive and anxiety-induced environment
such that an accused may want to unburden herself, notwithstand
ing the lack of a relationship of trust. 277 Because of this, it is critical
to examine how the nature of the relationship impacts and conte x
tualizes the nature of the exchange itself and not whether a rela
tionship of trust exists in isolation. The critical aspect of the right to
silence is that it offers an accused a choice to speak to authorities.
That choice should not be predicated upon the existence of a rela
tionship with someone who may have subverted that choice.
276. See, e.g., id. 'lI 54.
277. In State v. Travis, the police placed Langlois, an undercover police officer,
into the defendant's cell. State v. Travis, 360 A.2d 548, 549 (R.I. 1976). Langlois was
brought to the cell in handcuffs that were removed once he entered the cell. Id. Lan
glois testified that he initiated a conversation with the defendant, who then made in
criminating statements. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Langlois
violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment Miranda rights as well as his rights under
the state constitution. Id. at 551. The court stated that: "[t]he mere presence of Lan
glois was an inducement to speak, and an inducement by a police officer. We see no
significant difference between a uniformed police officer asking questions of defendant
and Langlois' presence inside the cellblock with defendant." Id. In this case, there was
no prior relationship of trust, and the mere presence of another person who initiated
"casual conversation" was sufficient to elicit incriminating statements. Id. at 550.
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Reframing Elicitation

Eliciting incriminating statements requires communication.
More often than not such communication will be achieved verbally,
through verbal interrogative or declarative statements that call for
incriminating responses. Verbal communication is understood and
conveyed through tone, the content of what is stated, and body lan
guage, in addition to the overall context, including the environment
and the relationship between the parties. Accordingly, when courts
design legal tests to determine whether incriminating statements
have been elicited, they need to factor in these various considera
tions.278 The United States Supreme Court's deliberate elicitation
test provides an important starting point by focusing on whether the
state and its agent took some action that goes beyond mere listen
ing and is designed to elicit incriminating statements. 279 By its
terms, "some action" should not be limited to the words that the
agent uses to elicit the statements, but should also include the over
all conduct of the state and its agent and possibly the use of body
language and other subtle cues.
The United States Supreme Court has also stressed the impor
tance of the detention context and how this may impact an accused.
Notwithstanding the absence of this consideration in Kuhlmann, its
acknowledgment by the Henry Court indicates that it is becoming a
more integral consideration when assessing conduct of the state and
its agent, not just a principle that is discarded when inconvenient. 28o
Last, in considering elicitation of incriminating information, courts
should factor into their deliberations any impact that the nature of
the relationship between the state agent and the accused may have
on the manner of the exchange and the form it takes. The focus
should not be on whether a relationship of trust exists, but on rec
ognizing the effect that any type of relationship, including one that
is perhaps threatening, may have in producing incriminating
statements.
278. White asserts that
the subtle messages that can be communicated through changes in vocal in
flection and nonverbal communication pose a formidable factfinding task for
the Court. ... Nevertheless there is a need to provide more meaningful gui
dance to the police and lower courts.... [I]t is possible to identify certain
interrogation tactics that are likely to create an unacceptable risk of depriving
the suspect of his constitutional rights.
White, Police Trickery, supra note 26, at 586.
279. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273-74 (1980).
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An elicitation test that stresses these various factors will pro
vide a more realistic and contextualized approach to understanding
human interaction within the cell-plant context. As Justice Bren
nan asserted in his Kuhlmann dissent, courts need to examine the
entire scope of government conduct and not merely look to the spe
cific statements of the agent when eliciting the inculpatory re
marks. 281 Examining the entire scope of government conduct
should ideally include some form of audio recording that captures
not only the actual statements of the state agent, but also the tone
and inflections used, which impact the listener's understanding of
what is communicated. A more complete examination of the elicit
ing conduct would, of course, benefit from an actual video record
ing so that a court could also observe the body language of the
agent and the accused during the exchange.
In a cell-plant interrogation, a sound recording device would
likely be more feasible than video recording equipment and would,
at a minimum, ensure that the factfinder could ascertain the actual
words spoken by both parties. Indeed, many jailhouse informants
have a proven record of fabricating stories and alleged statements
by an accused. 282 Where evidence is introduced by way of jailhouse
281. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
282. A variety of convictions have been overturned or impugned due to the ad
mission of fabricated evidence that was based upon informant testimony. See, e.g., R. v.
Sophonow, 38 Man. R.2d 198 (Man. c.A. 1986), available at 1986 CarswellMan 498
(Westlaw), not followed in R. v. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.c.R. 525 (1989 Can.), available at
1989 Carswell Que 16; R. v. Morin, 37 C.R.4th 395 (Ont. c.A. 1995), available at 1995
OntCarswell16 (Westlaw). At the conclusion of a commission of inquiry following one
such overturned conviction in Canada, Justice Fred Kaufman stated:
The systemic evidence ... emanating from Canada, Great Britain, Austra
lia and the United States demonstrated to me that these dangers were not
unique to the in-custody informers presented in the Morin case. Indeed, a
number of miscarriages of justice throughout the world are likely explained, at
least in part, by the false, self-serving evidence given by such informers.
1 FRED KAUFMAN, REPORT OF THE KAUFMAN COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLV
ING GUY PAUL MORIN 554 (1998), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.
ca/english/abouUpubs/morinimorin3h3cd.pdf. In the context of a subsequent and simi
lar commission of inquiry, presided over by former Supreme Court of Canada Justice
Peter Cory, his Honor issued a strong admonition against the use of jailhouse infor
mants. He stated:
Jailhouse informants comprise the most deceitful and deceptive group of
witnesses known to frequent the courts. The more notorious the case, the
greater the number of prospective informants. They rush to testify like vul
tures to rotting flesh or sharks to blood. They are smooth and convincing liars.
Whether they seek favours from the authorities, attention or notoriety they
are in every instance completely unreliable. It will be seen how frequently
they have been a major factor in the conviction of innocent people and how
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informants during such interrogations, courts should, short of ban
ning the use of informant testimony altogether, demand as a consti
tutional requirement that the state provide audio-recorded
evidence to support informant testimony.283
Although there are potentially greater dangers to admitting
testimony of jailhouse informants absent a taped recording, courts
should not necessarily be willing to admit testimony of undercover
police officers about their alleged conversations with a defendant
absent similar recordings. 284 Commentators have stressed the need
for the recording of formal non-undercover interrogations, and
nothing less should be expected during surreptitious interroga
tions. 285 Police officers are capable of faulty memory and, worse
still, distorting statements to serve the perceived needs of the state
by whom they are employed. While requiring such substantiation
through audio recording devices in earlier eras of police investiga
tion may have been impractical, modern technology permits such
possibilities.
It is time that the courts require the police to employ such re
cording methods during cell-plant interrogations because transmuch they tend to corrupt the administration of justice. Usually, their pres
ence as witnesses signals the end of any hope of providing a fair trial.
They must be recognized as a very great danger to our trial system. Steps
must be taken to rid the courts of this cancerous corruption of the administra
tion of justice. Perhaps, the greatest danger flows from their ability to testify
falsely in a remarkably convincing manner. In this case, it will be seen that an
experienced detective thought that Mr. Martin, a very frequent jailhouse in
formant with a conviction for perjury, was a credible witness. He lied in this
case and he has testified in at least nine other cases, undoubtedly with the
same degree of mendacity. Jailhouse informants are a festering sore. They
constitute a malignant infection that renders a fair trial impossible. They
should, as far as it is possible, be excised and removed from our trial process.
Jailhouse informants are a uniquely evil group. Justice Kaufman in the
Morin Inquiry dealt extensively with jailhouse informants and the harm that
they occasion. His thoughtful and helpful recommendations are carefully set
out in his report. I will adopt them but go still further in my recommendations
on this subject.
MANITOBA JUSTICE, THE INQUIRY REGARDING THOMAS SOPHONOW (2001), http://
www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/appendixlappendixf.pdf.
283. In Kuhlmann it was unclear what exactly was said when Wilson and Lee
spoke to each other and what Lee may have said to induce Wilson to make his incrimi
nating admissions. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 439. In Broyles II, the informant's testimony
told a much different story than what the detective recounted in his testimony. R. v.
Broyles (Broyles II), 312 A.R. 31, <JI<JI 6-7 (Alta c.A. 1999) (Can.), available at 1999
CarswellAlta 341 (Westlaw).
284. This is not to suggest that where the state agent is an undercover police
officer, the court should allow the admission absent recorded verification.
285. See Leo et aI., supra note 35, at 522.
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parency of government operations is essential for preserving a fair
trial and promoting respect for the integrity of the judicial system.
Such minimum requirements further reflect the importance of the
constitutional rights that are implicated, for if questioning takes
place in the absence of counsel, it should be incumbent on courts to
ensure that the manner in which the statements were elicited does
not fall short of standards required by principles of adjudicative
fairness. Such considerations are consonant with a purposive ap
proach to the rights to silence and counsel in Canada and the
United States respectively.
Although the United States version of the elicitation test is
preferable to the Canadian version, even under the United States
approach "mere listening" should really mean mere listening or its
functional equivalent. The Kuhlmann Court strayed from a strict
interpretation of "mere listening" when it found Kuhlmann's state
ments-spoken during his conversations with Lee-admissible. 286
It is conceivable that that there is a functional equivalent to mere
listening; there is the possibility that a state agent may make some
statements that have no reasonable connection to the crime that the
accused has committed and would not reasonably call for an incrim
inating response, yet nevertheless result in the accused making such
statements.
The factual context of Broyles II helps to illustrate the concept
of mere listening or its functional equivalent. 287 Assume that
Broyles disclosed his incriminating statements to the state agent fol
lowing Broyles's conversation with his mother and his pastor in ex
actly the same manner that was described in the decision. 288
However, instead of Broyles first meeting the agent two weeks
prior, they met the very same day that Broyles disclosed the incrim
inating statements. Assume that following this first meeting,
Broyles sensed that the state agent, as compared to other inmates,
was a sympathetic individual and thus felt comfortable approaching
the agent following his conversation with his mother and pastor.
Would the agent's questions, in the absence of a relationship of
trust, still rise to the level of action that went beyond mere listening
or its functional equivalent? Indeed, even in the absence of such a
relationship, the question "what do you mean?" was likely to elicit
286.

Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 439; see also supra notes 181-196 and accompanying

text.
287. For a discussion of the facts of Broyles II, 312 A.R. 31, see supra notes 216
224 and accompanying text.
288. See Broyles II, 312 A.R. 31, <J[ 16.
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incriminating statements. Broyles was clearly distraught and his
first statement in response to the question alluded to his crime.
Therefore, the state agent's question was bound to draw a more
elaborate response and could not be construed as mere listening.
This is particularly true given that the pressures of confinement can
influence some individuals to allay their anxiety by speaking to fel
low inmates, regardless whether they have a prior relationship of
trust,289 A question delivered by a state agent pretending to be a
fellow inmate that reasonably leads to an inmate uttering incrimi
nating statements is action that goes beyond mere listening.
By contrast, imagine the following variation of the hypotheti
cal. Instead of Broyles seeking out the state agent following the
conversation with his mother and pastor, he sits alone in a corner
quietly. The state agent has no particular knowledge of Broyles's
mother's visit and approaches Broyles asking him about his day.
Broyles then says "I've seen better days." The state agent re
sponds, "I know what that's like, but things get better, don't
worry." Broyles then responds: "Can't help but worry, I'm going to
burn in hell for killing my girlfriend." The state agent responds,
"Whoa. Listen, don't go repeating that to the wrong people, it
could land you in trouble." Broyles, realizing what he just said,
changes the topic quickly. In this scenario, the state agent's state
ments prior to Broyles's inculpatory remarks would be the func
tional equivalent of "mere listening" because his comments would
not reasonably lead to an incriminating response. The normative
argument in support of this reading is that while custodial environ
ments do impose a certain degree of pressure, defendants can make
voluntary statements that are completely unsolicited.
CONCLUSION: REINVIGORATING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

This Article has explored the constitutional approaches to cell
plant interrogations in Canada and the United States. While it is
clear that constitutional protections exist in both countries, these
protections are far from perfect with respect to providing adequate
safeguards to the accused. The Sixth Amendment, as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court, only comes into effect once
formal proceedings have commenced against an accused with re
spect to a particular offense, leaving an individual in the United
States without any effective prophylaxis against cell-plant interro
gations prior to this period. Furthermore, in order for the Sixth
289.

See, e.g., State v. Travis, 360 A.2d 548, 551 (R.I. 1976).
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Amendment to have any effect on suppressing statements acquired
during a cell-plant interrogation, the accused must show that a con
tractual relationship existed between the putative state agent and
the authorities. In various state and federal jurisdictions, the con
tractual requirement seems to require a more express agreement,
whereas in others the agreement may be implied.
The Canadian Charter's s. 7 right to silence provision protects
an accused upon arrest or detention, but is spatially confined to a
detention setting. While more flexible on determining state agency,
the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of elicitation under s.
7 requires the accused to show a significant relationship of trust be
tween the accused and the state agent, one that makes an accused
more vulnerable if the incriminating statements are made soon af
ter being placed in detention to a person he may have spoken to for
a few hours or less.
The rights to counsel and silence in the United States and Ca
nada respectively require significant strengthening. One of the pri
mary purposes of these rights is to provide a considerable degree of
fundamental fairness to individuals subjected to criminal investiga
tion by the superior power of law enforcement officials. When the
Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States extended consti
tutional protections to individuals subjected to cell-plant interroga
tions, they recognized that to do otherwise would allow police
officers to do surreptitiously what they could not do directly.290
Yet, by establishing such significant hurdles for accuseds to prove
violations of their constitutional rights, the Courts in both countries
have effectively undermined these rights. 291 In so doing, these
rights almost become a facade. One way in which to reestablish a
considerable degree of fairness for Canadian and United States sus
pects in these contexts would be to combine the most progressive
290. See, e.g., R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151, 'll 123 (Can. 1990), available at
1990 CarswellYukon 7 (Westlaw).
291. Courts need to recognize the realities of prison life and the pressures and
anxieties inherent within. One study recounts the revelations of Sol Wachtler, a former
Chief Judge for the New York Court of Appeals, who, after being incarcerated, noted
the skewed picture that judges are presented of life in detention. He wrote: "'I always
knew that 1 was seeing only what 1 was supposed to see [as a judge], but 1 felt my visit
was a demonstration to the inmates that we cared about their conditions.''' See MOR
RIS, supra note 21, at 180 (citing Colman McCarthy, A Judge's Report from Behind
Bars, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1995, at A17). Wachtler further reflected however that
'''[n]ow that I am prisoner and judges are being shown the facility that imprisons me, 1
realize how deluded 1 was in those years by my own vanity and by those escorts who so
carefully planned my itinerary.'" Id.
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and protective attributes of the applicable Canadian and American
law.
The legal tests and factors used to determine the existence of
state agency and elicitation should be reformulated in both coun
tries. For instance, with respect to evaluating the establishment of
state agency, courts in Canada and the United States should look to
whether law enforcement officials intervened in some manner that
had a tangible impact on the exchange between the accused and the
putative agent. In determining what constitutes an agency relation
ship between the state and a jailhouse informant, courts should
look to both overt and subtle forms of communication that the state
may use to signal to an informant that it is interested in receiving
information about other individuals within the jailhouse or prison
environment, regardless whether such individuals are specifically
identified or not. The focus should be on the intervention of the
state in stimulating an exchange between an agent and an accused.
Courts should not deny the existence of an agency relationship
merely because the agent is not promised or provided
remuneration.
The Supreme Court of Canada and the United States Supreme
Court should adopt a broader test for determining elicitation that
expands on the latter's deliberate elicitation test enunciated in
Kuhlmann. 292 Under a broadened test, defendants in Canada and
the United States who seek to quash any incriminating statements
procured through a cell-plant interrogation should have to satisfy
the following test: taking into account the pressures of confinement
and its impact upon the accused, did the police or its agents take
some action beyond mere listening or its functional equivalen~, that
was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks from the
accused? Furthermore, unlike the Kuhlmann Court's application of
that test, "mere listening" should actually mean "mere listening" or
its functional equivalent. This is particularly true where discussion
is initiated about the crime or crimes for which the accused is
charged or could reasonably lead to the utterance of incriminating
statements about the crimes charged. In addition, when the elicita
tion takes place in the detention context, courts must take into ac
count how the contextual impact of confinement may have
heightened the impact of the agent's actions leading to the utter
ance of the incriminating statements.
292.

See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986).
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Courts should examine the full course of conduct by the state
and its agents when assessing whether a suspect's statements were
elicited. For example, where the agent has developed a relationship
with the accused, the extent to which such an agent may have to
take "some action" beyond mere listening may be significantly less
than an agent who is able to elicit incriminating statements from an
accused she has just met. However, the absence of such a relation
ship should not lead to the conclusion that a state agent in such
circumstances must then ask questions that are akin to a formal in
terrogation or its functional equivalent. As long as the agent com
mits to some action beyond mere listening or its functional
equivalent, such conduct should be sufficient to demonstrate
elicitation.
Lastly, in order to properly assess the record in a more com
prehensive manner, including the actions of the state agent, the en
tire course of the communications between the agent and the
accused should be recorded. Courts will then not have to rely
solely upon the potential fabrications of the accused or a jailhouse
informant or the genuinely faulty memory of any state agent in re
counting the details of the exchange.
Emphasizing such flexible factors will be consistent with a pur
posive interpretation of the s. 7 right to silence and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, one that draws upon "the principles
of adjudicative fairness" and "concern for fair treatment of an ac
cused person."293 It will provide more meaningful substance to
these fundamental constitutional rights that exist to limit the over
whelming and overreaching power of the state against individuals.
This power imbalance is heightened against suspects who are de
tained by the state and subject to intense anxieties inherent to
custody.294
United States and Canadian courts are the vanguards of consti
tutional protections. To allow the state to circumvent such funda
mental rights by exploiting a detainee's vulnerability in such a
deceptive manner cannot be in accordance with the purpose of the
Canadian Charter or the United States Constitution. Courts must
restore balance to this disequilibrium lest these core protections be
so easily circumvented by unfair state tactics that they are rendered
practically obsolete.
293. R. v. Brydges, [1990] 1 S.c.R. 190, 'II 13 (Can. 1990), available at 1990
CarswellAlta 3 (Westlaw) (citing R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.c.R. 383 (Can. 1986), availa
ble at 1986 CarswellNB 14 (Westlaw)).
294. See discussion supra Part I.

